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Key activities in critical systems are the monitoring, observation and comprehension of 
different phenomena, aimed at providing an updated and meaningful description of the 
monitored scenario, as well as its possible evolutions, to enable proper decisions and 
countermeasures for the protection and safety of people and things. The threats coming 
from many different sources, internally and externally. The diffusion of new technologies 
have made more accessible the assets of a system. 
In this thesis we demonstrate that the use of a semantic model for the information 
management it is suitable in order to meet these issues. In particular, thesis proposes and 
implement a methodology and approach for the early situation awareness recognizing a 
threat situation on time, for decision support to automatically activate recovery strategies. 
The threat on which the thesis focus on are regarded the logical and physical security. In 
particular for the logical security estimation will be presented a an approach guided by 
metrics. Then will be presented some results and example of real application. 
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Introduction 
The recent interests on the adoption of cyber infrastructures for developing smart 
surveillance system and for homeland protection has led the international scientific 
community in an effort aimed at the definition of new security strategies and tools. Key 
activities in security systems are the monitoring, observation and comprehension of 
different phenomena, aimed at providing an updated and meaningful description of the 
monitored scenario, as well as its possible evolutions, to enable proper decisions and 
countermeasures for the protection and safety of people and things. 
The threats coming from many different sources, internally and externally. The diffusion 
of new technologies have made more accessible the assets of a system.  The asset and 
information can also be accessed physical by the insider, but using, for instance the 
network, they are accessible by the outsiders who can explore and penetrate the network 
and the logic perimeter of a system. In addition, outsider access can be enhanced by the 
recruitment of insiders to furnish important information on the protection in place  or key 
applications. 
In these scenarios, not only smart surveillance and alert systems are needed but enriched 
decision support systems (DSS) are desirable. Such systems rely on heterogeneous data 
acquisition tools and on data elaboration to prune non-significant information; 
nevertheless, this is not enough as there is the need to interpret what data really 
represents to reduce false alarms and detect even weak risk conditions. 
The availability of advanced monitoring techniques and heterogeneous information 
sources has increased the accuracy in observing, measuring and describing the nature of 
phenomena: the current level of technology in this field represents an opportunity to 
improve the understanding about observed phenomena but, at the same time, it 
introduces a high degree of complexity in the data elaboration and fusion. However, many 
automatic and intelligent detection systems generate unnecessary warnings (false 
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alarms); this problem, unfortunately, dramatically limits the use of these systems to 
enable automatic or partially automatic countermeasures. 
Smart DSSs are needed to enable, when possible, the automatic adoption of 
countermeasures in case of alarms or to support end-users during decision making 
activities (when a too large number of sensors, devices, or cameras placed inside the site 
to be protected produce a wide amount of data to be processed). 
In recent years, scientific world’s attention has been devoted to both the information 
management with data and decision fusion approaches. On the other hand, to improve the 
situation assessment, it is possible to adopt different types of models for the description of 
the knowledge-base, for event correlation and for the definition of the situation and threat 
identification. Very promising approaches are based on semantic and ontological models  
A semantic model can be used for understanding observed phenomena. All sensors should 
use the same data model and the same interpretation of data, a shared data model 
provides syntactic interoperability mechanisms but this is not enough, a more complex 
system model is needed to even provide semantic interoperability. In the literature, some 
approaches based on semantic inference rules for phenomena comprehension are 
available. Nevertheless, due to the introduced overhead, the knowledge base is usually 
inferred in offline mode. 
The use of this kind of system is often associated to the management of physical security of 
an infrastructure, but during last years it has widespread the need of evaluation of logical 
security. The two kind of security are not separated, they came together and are strictly 
connected. 
In this thesis we demonstrate that the use of a semantic model for the information 
management it is suitable in order to meet these issues. In particular, thesis proposes a 
methodology and approach for the early situation awareness recognizing a threat 
situation on time, for decision support to automatically activate recovery strategies. The 
threat on which the thesis focus on are regarded the logical and physical security. In 
particular for the logical security estimation will be presented a an approach guided by 
metrics, developed during the collaboration in European Project (nSHIELD). The summary 
of  activities are: 
• Starting from state of art, providing a innovative methodology for security 
information (physical and logical) fusion and correlation by semantic model in 
order to  ensure a correct and shared information interpretation into events 
and situation assessment before raising an alarm. 
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• Developing a  smart Decision Support System based on semantic and 
ontological approach.  The semantic enrichment process is automatically 
performed to build a knowledge base, which will be inferred on-line by a light 
smart classifier that will raise an alarm in case of risk detection. The decision 
approach will be based on two steps: (1) a smart in-line classifier based on the 
semantic model to raise an alarm, in case of threat event detection, (2) a post 
reasoner offline inference engine, in order to further comprehend the event and 
its causes. 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. The chapter 1 presents a panoramic view of the 
problem of critical infrastructures protection. It introduces the main sector in which is 
required a protection by malicious and non malicious threats. Then it underlines the 
problem of security of an infrastructure, introducing the issues not only on physical 
security protection but even at logical security level. Finally, the chapter presents the 
contribution and aim of this thesis work. 
The chapter 2 introduces the problem of integration of information by a semantic model 
perspective. The chapter aims to introduce the readers in this world proposing the basic 
concepts and main solution presented in the scientific literature. In this way the readers 
have a awareness of the problem and on the solution proposed in this thesis. 
The chapter 3 gives a view of a state of art on different topic discussed in this thesis, in 
particular on convergence of physical and logical security for the infrastructure protection. 
Then it presents the state of art on complex event processing, decision support system and 
then on semantic modelling of decision support systems. 
The last 3 chapter are the description of the contribution on this thesis. In the chapter 4 
will be presented the  approach for information integration based on semantic model. The 
process for the semantic enrichment of the information from different king of source, the 
population of ontology domain and the inference methodology for the detection. Then it w 
ill described the process of the post resoner. 
The chapter 5 introduces the metric for the estimation of logical security. The metrics 
derived from a collaboration on an European project called nSHIELD. The metrics have a 
proper semantic model, so the are suitable for an elaboration by the semantic classifier 
and realized a first approach to the convergence of logical an security convergence. 
Finally in the chapter  6 present some application results and some example of application 
of security convergence. 
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Chapter 1 
The Critical Infrastructure Protection 
In the recent year, Critical Infrastructure Protection has became an important issues, for the 
protection against terrorism and any other form of criminality. It requires the development of 
innovative approaches in order to match the challenges of Homeland Security. This section 
provides the description on the current background with its related issues and involved 
technologies countermeasures; finally it illustrates the motivations and the main 
contributions of this thesis. 
 
1.1 The problem of CIP 
 
A Critical Infrastructure (CI) represents for an infrastructure or asset the incapacity or 
destruction of which would have a debilitating impact on the national security and the 
economic and social welfare of a nation. Such infrastructures could be damaged by non 
malicious threats as well as by malicious attacker. In recent years the architectural of CIs has 
changed because of several economic, technological and social reasons related to privatization 
and globalization processes. This aspect offers capabilities to the global economy and allowed 
to improve the quality of services provided, but on the other one it introduced new 
vulnerabilities. Each infrastructures (e.g. telecommunication, network, etc..) now depend on 
services provided by other infrastructures (e.g. information system, transportation system, 
air-traffic control,  etc…). These means the creation of extensive troubles because a cascade 
effects and an interdependencies of malfunctions. All components of the infrastructures are 
linked and are part of the same chain to be protected. For this reason is important to identify 
innovative approach to mitigate and manage the threats. 
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In response to these challenges  one of the fundamental aspects  consists in territorial 
monitoring, aimed at providing an updated and meaningful description of the monitored 
scenario, as well as its possible evolutions, allowing interventions and countermeasures, 
when required for the protection  of people and things. 
Hence descends the crucial role of precocious alert systems, of decision support systems, and 
of intelligent surveillance systems. All such solutions rely on data acquisition by means of 
heterogeneous sensing tools, data elaboration aimed at pruning non significant information, 
and on the interpretation of the high-level meaning of what data represent, with the aim of 
reducing false positives as well as detecting weak alarm conditions. The availability of 
advanced monitoring techniques and heterogeneous information sources has increased the 
accuracy in observing, measuring and describing the nature of phenomena: the current 
development level of technology in this field represent an opportunity to improve the 
understanding about observed phenomena, but at the same time introduced a high degree of 
complexity in the data elaboration and fusion. The international scientific community has 
reached significant results in those fields. Despite that, the development of methodologies and 
tools allowing to implement automatic situation understanding and decision support tools 
which comply with security standards required in common is still an open research issue. 
Furthermore, information fusion and decision support systems are complementary research 
areas, yet typically separately dealt with, and few methodological approaches try to combine 
benefits from both areas. Furthermore, current decision support systems suffer from 
numerous limitations, partly due to such separation of research fields, since they are typically 
designed and developed for specific domains and hardly adaptable, both to domain changes, 
both to novel threat scenarios. 
 
1.2  Application Domain 
 
Critical infrastructures include material and ITC assets, networks, services, and installations. 
These can be applied in different sectors (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 Classification of main critical infrastructure sectors 
 
As specified in [1]. A classification of critical infrastructure sector is shown in figure 1: 
o Chemical Sector: The sector can be divided into five main segments, based on the end 
product produced: 
o Basic chemicals 
o Specialty chemicals 
o Agricultural chemicals 
o Pharmaceuticals 
o Consumer products 
Each of these segments has distinct characteristics, growth dynamics, markets, new 
developments, and issues. The majority of Chemical Sector facilities are privately 
owned, requiring to work closely with the private sector and its industry associations 
to set goals and objectives, identify assets, assess risks, prioritize needs, and 
implement protective programs. 
The Chemical Sector is dependent on and depended on by a wide range of other 
sectors, including: Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Emergency Services, 
Energy, Food and Agriculture, Healthcare and Public Health, Information Technology, 
Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems.  
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o The Communications Sector is an integral component of the economy, underlying the 
operations of all businesses, public safety organizations, and government. The sector 
has evolved from predominantly a provider of voice services into a diverse, 
competitive, and interconnected industry using terrestrial, satellite, and wireless 
transmission systems. The transmission of these services has become interconnected; 
satellite, wireless, and wired providers depend on each other to carry and terminate 
their traffic and companies routinely share facilities and technology to ensure 
interoperability. 
The private sector, as owners and operators of the majority of communications 
infrastructure, is the primary entity responsible for protecting sector infrastructure 
and assets. Working with the federal government, the private sector is able to predict, 
anticipate, and respond to sector outages and understand how they might affect the 
ability of the national leadership to communicate during times of crisis, impact the 
operations of other sectors, and affect response and recovery efforts. 
o Energy Sector: The reliance of virtually all industries on electric power and fuels 
means that all sectors have some dependence on the Energy Sector. The Energy Sector 
is well aware of its vulnerabilities and is leading a significant voluntary effort to 
increase its planning and preparedness. Cooperation through industry groups has 
resulted in substantial information sharing of best practices across the sector. Many 
sector owners and operators have extensive experience abroad with infrastructure 
protection and have more recently focused their attention on cyber security. 
o The Financial Sector represents a vital component of nation's critical infrastructure. 
Large-scale power outages, recent natural disasters, and an increase in the number and 
sophistication of cyber attacks demonstrate the wide range of potential risks facing the 
sector. Financial institutions provide a broad array of products from the largest 
institutions with assets greater than one trillion dollars to the smallest community 
banks and credit unions. Whether an individual savings account, financial derivatives, 
credit extended to a large organization, or investments made to a foreign country, 
these products allow customers to: 
o Deposit funds and make payments to other parties; 
o Provide credit and liquidity to customers; 
o Invest funds for both long and short periods; and 
o Transfer financial risks between customers. 
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o The Healthcare and Public Health Sector protects all sectors of the economy from 
hazards such as terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, and natural disasters. Because 
the vast majority of the sector's assets are privately owned and operated, collaboration 
and information sharing between the public and private sectors is essential to 
increasing resilience of the nation's Healthcare and Public Health critical 
infrastructure. The sector plays a significant role in response and recovery across all 
other sectors in the event of a natural or manmade disaster. While healthcare tends to 
be delivered and managed locally, the public health component of the sector, focused 
primarily on population health, is managed across all levels of government: national, 
state, regional, local, tribal, and territorial. 
o The Information Technology Sector is central to the nation's security, economy, and 
public health and safety. Businesses, governments, academia, and private citizens are 
increasingly dependent upon Information Technology Sector functions. These virtual 
and distributed functions produce and provide hardware, software, and information 
technology systems and services, and - in collaboration with the Communications 
Sector - the Internet. The sector's complex and dynamic environment makes 
identifying threats and assessing vulnerabilities difficult and requires that these tasks 
be addressed in a collaborative and creative fashion. 
Information Technology Sector functions are operated by a combination of entities - 
often owners and operators and their respective associations - that maintain and 
reconstitute the network, including the Internet. Although information technology 
infrastructure has a certain level of inherent resilience, its interdependent and 
interconnected structure presents challenges as well as opportunities for coordinating 
public and private sector preparedness and protection activities. 
o The transportation system quickly, safely, and securely moves people and goods 
through the country and overseas. The Transportation Systems Sector consists 
of seven key subsectors, or modes: 
o Aviation includes aircraft, air traffic control systems, and approximately 450 
commercial airports and 19,000 additional airports, heliports, and landing 
strips. This mode includes civil and joint use military airports, heliports, short 
takeoff and landing ports, and seaplane bases. 
o Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier encompasses nearly 4 million 
miles of roadway, almost 600,000 bridges, and some 400 tunnels in 35 states. 
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Vehicles include automobiles, motorcycles, trucks carrying hazardous materials, 
other commercial freight vehicles, motor coaches, and school buses. 
o Maritime Transportation System consists of about 95,000 miles of coastline, 
361 ports, 25,000 miles of waterways, 3.4 million square miles of Exclusive 
Economic Zone, and intermodal landside connections, which allow the various 
modes of transportation to move people and goods to, from, and on the water. 
o Mass Transit and Passenger Rail includes service by buses, rail transit 
(commuter rail, heavy rail--also known as subways or metros--and light rail, 
including trolleys and streetcars), long-distance rail--namely Amtrak and Alaska 
Railroad--and other, less common types of service (cable cars, inclined planes, 
funiculars, and automated guide way systems). 
o Pipeline Systems consist of vast networks of pipeline that traverse hundreds of 
thousands of miles throughout the country, carrying nearly all of the nation's 
natural gas and about 65 percent of hazardous liquids, as well as various 
chemicals. These include approximately 2.2 million miles of natural gas 
distribution pipelines, about 168,900 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines, and 
more than 109 liquefied natural gas processing and storage facilities. 
o Freight Rail consists of seven major carriers, hundreds of smaller railroads, 
over 140,000 miles of active railroad, over 1.3 million freight cars, and roughly 
20,000 locomotives. Further, over 12,000 trains operate daily. The Department 
of Defense has designated 30,000 miles of track and structure as critical to 
mobilization and resupply of U.S. forces. 
o Postal and Shipping moves over 574 million messages, products, and financial 
transactions each day. Postal and shipping activity is differentiated from 
general cargo operations by its focus on letter or flat mail, publications, or 
small- and medium-size packages and by service from millions of senders to 
nearly 152 million destinations. 
o The Critical Manufacturing Sector is crucial to the economic prosperity and 
continuity of the United States. A direct attack on or disruption of certain elements of 
the manufacturing industry could disrupt essential functions at the national level and 
across multiple critical infrastructure sectors. The Critical Manufacturing Sector 
identified the following industries to serve as the core of the sector: 
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o Primary Metal Manufacturing: Iron and Steel Mills and Ferro Alloy 
Manufacturing; Alumina and Aluminum Production and Processing; and 
Nonferrous Metal (except Aluminum) Production and Processing 
o Machinery Manufacturing: Engine, Turbine, and Power Transmission 
Equipment Manufacturing 
o Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing: Electrical 
Equipment Manufacturing 
o Transportation Equipment Manufacturing: Vehicle Manufacturing, Aviation and 
Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing; and Railroad Rolling Stock 
Manufacturing 
Products made by these manufacturing industries are essential in varying capacities to 
many other critical infrastructure sectors. The Critical Manufacturing Sector focuses on 
the identification, assessment, prioritization, and protection of nationally significant 
manufacturing industries within the sector that may be susceptible to manmade and 
natural disasters. 
 
1.3 Critical Infrastructure the Event Cycle 
 
For each system can be developed an assurance plan in order to: 
o assess its vulnerabilities to both physical and cyber attacks; 
o plan to reduce vulnerabilities; 
o develop systems to identify and, if possible, prevent attempted attacks; 
o contain attacks and trigger adequate countermeasures. 
The infrastructure assurance plan includes several tasks and follows the six-step U.S. 
DoD (Department of Defense) life cycle (see ref. [2]) shown in Figure 2. the six steps 
describes activities that occur for and efficient event management and comprehend the 
effects. 
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Figure 2 Event Life Cycle 
 
 
1. Analysis and assessment. This activity is the foundation and the most important 
element of the life cycle phases. It aims to indentify critical assets and determine their 
risks and vulnerabilities, as well as their interdependencies, configurations and 
characteristics. The assessment also evaluates the operational impact of infrastructure 
loss or degradation. 
2. Remediation. This phase involves precautionary measures and actions taken before 
an event occurs to fix the known cyber and physical vulnerabilities. It aims at 
developing and installing short/long range strategies to reduce risks. Remediation 
actions may include the choice and installation of protection mechanisms, but also 
education and awareness, procedural changes or system configuration and component 
changes. Obviously remediation actions have a cost based on the nature of 
vulnerabilities and a cost/benefit analysis could be useful to support the design of a 
security system to protect a CI. 
3. Indications and warning. This phase involves the continuous monitoring to assess 
the assurance capabilities of critical infrastructure assets and to determine if there are 
event indications to report. Indications are preparatory actions or preliminary 
infrastructure conditions that signify that an incident is likely, is planned, or is under 
way. Warning is the process of notifying asset  owners of a possible threat or hazard. 
Integration platforms for heterogeneous input data sources could come to support this 
phase as well. 
4. Mitigation. It comprises actions taken before or during an event in response to 
warnings or incidents. The aim is to minimize the operational impact of the loss or 
debilitation of a critical asset by taking the opportune countermeasures. 
5. Incident response. This phase comprises the plans and activities taken to eliminate 
the cause or source of an infrastructure event. 
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6. Reconstitution. The last phase of the CIP life cycle, involves actions taken to rebuild or 
restore a critical asset capability after it has been damaged or destroyed. This phase is 
the most challenging and least developed process. 
 
This steps assure the coordination of protection and coordination of activities, ensuring a high 
security degree. The bad coordination and execution of one of these steps can be expose the 
system to potential risks of failure and compromise the services of CI. For these reasons the 
most important activities is the first phase (Analysis and Assessment), it refers to risk 
assessment focuses on asset and their threats. The risk assessment process measures the 
expected risk of and infrastructure basis on a careful analysis of threats and relative 
vulnerability. Furthermore the risk mitigation process is able to choose the countermeasures 
and forecast their impact on risk. The overall iterative process is named risk management. 
 
1.4 Critical Infrastructure: Threats and countermeasures 
 
 
As described in [7], a CI, such as Mass Transportation  System have the variety of settings of a 
and asset (Figure 3). 
Transit system are constantly faced with the challenge of managing risks to their assets. Each 
asset has its own level of risk based on its attractiveness as a target, vulnerabilities, 
accessibility, and criticality to the system. The process of evaluating risk and implementing 
countermeasures requires a high effort. 
Since funding for security efforts is limited, security measures for each asset must be 
commensurate with the threats and vulnerabilities of that particular asset and the potential 
consequences of an attack or other disaster. 
The diversity of assets of a mass transit system leads to a range of possible threats and 
countermeasures. Some assets might be targets for a terrorist attack intended to inflict 
civilian injuries; others might be means for providing misinformation to the public, others  for 
obtaining sensitive information about the system. Transit systems or their components could 
also be affected indirectly by an attack elsewhere, which may compromise communications, 
operations, or maintenance capabilities. Results of attacks or incidents might include: 
• Loss of life or physical damage to passengers, staff 
• Physical damage to infrastructure, and possibly to the surrounding environment 
• Loss of power through direct attack or by external event 
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• Non authorized access to the information of CI 
• Alteration or disruption of information 
 
Several threats can be identify in a mass transit system, some of them are discussed in [7]. 
 
 
Figure 3 Assets of transportation systems 
 
 
Arson 
 
The hazards of arson, an intentionally set fire, in a transit facility include the destruction of 
assets within the facility, structural damage to the facility itself, and injuries or fatalities due 
to direct exposure to fire or to smoke and fumes.  
Burning fuel, oil, plastics, and some paints can cause dense smoke and toxic fumes. Toxic 
fumes present a serious health threat and may cause death by asphyxiation. In addition, 
smoke can reduce visibility, obscuring exit pathways and making escape more difficult for 
victims. Since fires may occur accidentally as well as intentionally, there is crossover between 
protection against accidental fires and protection from arson. Arson and explosion-related 
fires, however, may cause more severe damage because they tend to target or cluster around 
critical systems and equipment. 
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Explosives 
 
The hazards of an explosive blast include the destruction of assets within a facility, structural 
damage to the facility itself, and injuries or fatalities. In addition, explosions may start a fire, 
which may inflict additional material damage, injuries, or fatalities due to direct exposure or 
to heat, smoke, and fumes. An explosion is an instantaneous or almost instantaneous chemical 
reaction resulting in a rapid release of energy. The energy is usually released as rapidly 
expanding gases and heat, which may be in the form of a fireball. The expanding gases 
compress the surrounding air creating a shock wave or pressure wave. The pressure wave can 
cause structural damage to the structure while the fireball may ignite other building materials 
leading to a larger fire. The strength of a blast depends on the type and amount of explosive 
material used. A bomb that a person can carry is capable of a smaller blast than an explosive-
laden truck. 
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) typically refer to nuclear, radiological, chemical, and 
biological weapons capable of inflicting mass casualties. WMD can also refer to radioactive 
materials and other contaminants intended to quickly harm large numbers of people, such as 
any powders, liquids, gases, and dirty bombs; most of these come in a liquid, vapor, gas, or 
powder form, and are spread through air movement. 
The hazards of WMD include fatalities or deleterious health effects, as well as potentially 
permanent contamination of a facility that may render it unusable. Many agents have little or 
no plainly discernable characteristics, so symptoms may be the first sign that an attack has 
occurred. While some chemical agents induce immediate symptoms, other agents will not 
produce symptoms for hours after the attack. Some biological agents may have an incubation 
period of up to a few days before symptoms appear. 
Tampering 
Tampering with transit facilities’ assets may be a means to achieve any of the above events, 
such as starting a fire or spreading an airborne chemical agent, or it may be a stand-alone act, 
such as tampering with track to induce derailment. It can also include the intentional 
ramming of a facility, with a truck, boat, or airplane, in order to cause structural damage to a 
facility or injury to its users. 
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The ramming vehicle may be laden with explosives. Depending on the situation, tampering 
may lead to asset damage, structural damage, contamination, injuries, and/or fatalities. 
 
Network Failure/Cyber Attack 
 
Transit systems rely on computerized networks to facilitate operations and enhance efficient 
service delivery, which makes them vulnerable to network failure and cyber attacks. While 
this document does not offer specific considerations on how to protect computer networks, it 
is crucial to understand their importance to operating and communicating among agency staff 
as well as with partner organizations and the public-at-large. Network failure may be caused 
by faulty or damaged internal components, direct cyber attack to the agency’s network, direct 
attack to a peripheral system or network, or even a blanket computer virus. The result may be 
loss of communications or operations capabilities as well as misinformation by hacking into a 
Web site or server. 
The principal strategies to counter  attacks can be: deter attackers from attempting an attack, 
detect potential threats promptly,  minimize the impact from an attack and respond and 
recover (or resume critical operations as quickly as possible). Applying these concepts to the 
physical design of infrastructure leads to several general strategies that are applicable to 
transit assets.  
Surveillance and monitoring of Infrastructure is based on sensor system deployed along 
assets in order to monitor several different parameters. The protection has the aim to reduce 
the vulnerabilities but also to be a deterrent (to reduce the rate of threats occurence). This 
make easy the management of emergency procedures due to a more precise monitoring. 
A typical PSIM system, for mass transit security, is composed by several kind of sensors [6], 
described follow.  
 
Anti-intrusion  and Access control systems.  
 
Devices has the ability to know when someone has entered a secured area. Access control is 
the ability to determine who can or cannot enter specific fields, areas or access particular 
assets. Traditional intrusion detection systems, made up by different devices such as: 
• volumetric sensors for motion detection; 
• magnetic contacts to detect illicit doors opening; 
• glass break detectors; 
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• microphones cables for fence/grill vibration detection; 
• active infrared barriers for detecting intrusions inside the tunnels. 
To distinguish between authorized and unauthorized accesses, it is necessary to employ 
access control systems to identify authorized staff by using: 
• possess (keys, badges, etc.) 
• knowledge (PIN, password, etc.) 
• individual biometric features (e.g. fingerprint reading) 
 
 
Intelligent video surveillance.  
 
 
Intelligent video surveillance is composed by 
• advanced cameras with special features;   
• digital video processing and recording, using efficient data compression protocols;  
• video-analytics of the scenes, using computer  vision algorithms; 
 
 The presence of surveillance works as deterrent not only because an area is being monitored 
remotely, but also because activities can be detected in automatic mode.  
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). This kind of sensor are more widespread due to their 
potential for providing diverse new capabilities to a wide variety of applications 
(environmental monitoring, health, object tracking and military applications).  
Other (smart) sensors. Other kind of sensors most used in the mass transit protection 
system are: 
 
• smoke and heat detectors for fire protection; 
• vibration and movement detectors  
• CBRNe (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive) sensors aimed at 
detecting harmful substances within the infrastructure assets. 
 
This heterogeneity of sub-systems technologies mentioned above and their measured data 
make difficult the interoperability among different systems, introduce the problem of   
integration, phenomena comprehension and manage the problem of information security. 
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1.5 Security of Critical Infrastructure 
 
The first aim in order to guarantee the correct working of a CI is to protected by malicious and 
non malicious threats. The foremost concepts is named Security the latter is safety.  In the CI 
domain the term security can be separated in two different means, physical and logical. 
Physical security describes security measures that are designed to deny unauthorized access 
to facilities, equipment and resources, and to protect personnel and property from damage or 
harm (such as espionage, theft, or terrorist attacks). Physical security involves the use of 
multiple layers of interdependent systems. Meanwhile logical security consist in protection of 
information and guarantee their integrity, availability and confidentiality.  
The introduction of security measures at the design phase is more effective than adopting a 
retroactive solution. An other issue is the quantity and the heterogeneity of assets located in 
several areas and with different exposition to threats. A Physical Security Information 
Management (PSIM) System should be able to protect different king of assets, having different 
risks, different vulnerabilities and criticalities. For these reasons the adoption of security 
measures is different for each assets and is a consequences of relative threats, as well as with 
the evaluation of potential attacks or malfunctioning of the asset. 
During last year ([3],[4],[5]) is born an other important issue, the logical security in 
correlation with physical. The security means physical (e.g. access control) or logical (e.g. 
virus detection, unauthorized  network access). Today, entities the manage these two types of 
security are separate and, often, do not collaborate. These have a dramatic impact on the 
protection of CI, as well as on security and safety. 
In general physical security system for an infrastructure is composed by: 
• Physical access control, such as card readers, biometric devices. 
• Power supply system: Uninterrupted Power Supplies (UPS), generators, electric 
distribution system. 
• Physical blocking mechanism: electromagnetic lock devices 
• Fire control system, 
• Life support system: heating, cooling, ventilation monitoring of temperature, humidity, 
condensation and etc. 
• Video and audio surveillance systems. 
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These sub-system work in conjunction with others services, such as network, information 
technology infrastructures.  For instance the door reader is connect to fire protection that is 
interfaced with CCTV (Closed Circuit television system) sub-system. Physical security focuses 
of protection of asset, people and infrastructure against threats. Add to this the need to 
protect the privacy and security of information by attacker and identity theft for instance is 
important. So the logical and physical security became a key issue. 
The access facilities can compromise the logical security of asset, the network security, the 
confidentiality of information, the authorized access to the information and the manipulation 
are a key issues. A combination of two kind of security gives a more comprehension of attack 
across the physical and logical environments.  The availability of sensor based on TCP/IP 
communication protocol are just some of the ways where logical security is tied to the 
physical access system. In the following sub-section it will be illustrated a panoramic of most 
widespread threats of a critical infrastructure and their countermeasures.  
 
1.6 Thesis Contributions 
 
As discussed  in the previous sections, CI are highly complex and composed by different 
sensor for monitoring, and then is requested high level of information security. For this 
reasons the protection of Critical Infrastructure has became and important activity which 
requires a multidisciplinary and innovative approach in order to identify the threats, detect 
the malicious event for the physical security requirements, assure the information security 
and then provide automatic countermeasures. 
Today, PSIM system needs to have reliable and secure information on time and integrate and 
merge them in a common vision in order to comprehend and detect event and then 
determinate the opportune countermeasures. So is required the use of appropriate 
technologies and methodologies. 
In order to achieve a correct methodology to overcomes the aforementioned issues the most 
important steps are: 
2. evaluate the risk of infrastructure to be protected. 
3. develop a methodology for determinate and prevent the threats, that  correlate and 
fuses different information for several sources. 
4. determinate the activities for an automatic countermeasures. 
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This thesis proposes a methodology and approach for the early situation awareness 
recognizing a threat situation on time, for decision support to automatically activate recovery 
strategies. The detailed activities are: 
• Starting from state of art, providing a innovative methodology for security 
information (physical and logical) fusion and correlation by semantic model in 
order to  ensure a correct and shared information interpretation into events 
and situation assessment before raising an alarm. 
• Developing a  smart Decision Support System based on semantic and 
ontological approach.  The semantic enrichment process is automatically 
performed to build a knowledge base, which will be inferred on-line by a light 
smart classifier that will raise an alarm in case of risk detection. The decision 
approach will be based on two steps: (1) a smart in-line classifier based on the 
semantic model to raise an alarm, in case of threat event detection, (2) a post 
reasoner offline inference engine, in order to further comprehend the event and 
its causes. 
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Chapter 2 
Integration and interoperability by Semantic modeling 
2.1 Semantic interoperability: XML and RDF 
 
In the research topic of interoperability, the use of data model provide to the whole 
system and its components a time consuming and the introduction of artificial software 
layers than can impact on control and performance. On the other hand this kind of 
techniques provides many advantages such as: 
• Availability of complete information, 
• Improvement of existing analysis and application of the new analysis. 
• Cost reduction resulting from the multiple use of existing information sources. 
• Avoidance of redundant data and conflicts. 
In literature exist various integration levels, that it is possible to investigate in order to 
provide complete integrated access to information: 
• Syntactic Integration: Many standards have evolved that can be used to integrate 
different information sources. Such as database interfaces (e.g. ODBC, HTML and 
XML). 
• Structural Integration: The first problem that passes a purely syntactic level is the 
integration of heterogeneous structures. This problem is solved by mediator systems 
defining mapping rules between different information structures. 
• Semantic Integration: is the resolution of semantic conflicts, that make a one to one 
mapping between concepts or terms impossible. 
The contribution of this theses  is to provide an general approach to the problem of 
information integration, taking into account the integration and combination several 
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technologies, including standard mark-up languages and ontologies. In order to overcome 
the aforementioned limitations it the issues can be solved considering the three level of 
integration.  
In particular the work is focused on semantic heterogeneity which is based on different 
semantics. In order to manage semantic heterogeneities, a formal representation is 
needed. Due to the diffusion of Web, some standard languages are developed, such as XML  
(eXtensible Markup Language) and RDF (Resource Description Framework) by the W3C 
community for this purpose [34], [35]. In order to overcame the semantic heterogeneity of 
these standard we will described the peculiarities of them and them we will proposes an 
integration/interoperation process based on Ontologies and XSLT (eXtensible Stylesheet 
Language Transformations) Transformation [36] and [34].  
XML and RDF have been developed for the semantic description of information sources. As 
described in [37] and [38], XML was proposed as an extensible language allowing the user 
to define new kind of tags in order to indicate the type of content. Therefore, the best 
benefit of XML is in the opportunity to exchange data in a structured way. A data object is 
said to be XML document if it follows the guidelines for well-formed XML documents 
provided by the W3C community. The specification provide a formal grammar used in 
well-formed documents. In addition is possible to extend the general grammar with the 
introduction, by users, of new grammatical constraints on the structure of a document 
using a document type definition (DTD). A XML document is valid if it has an associated 
type definition and complies to the grammatical constraints of that definition. A DTD 
specifies elements that can be used in an XML document. In the document, the elements 
are delimited by a start and an end tag. It has a type and may have a set of attribute 
specifications consisting of a name and a value. The additional constraints in a DTD refer 
to the logical structure of the document, this especially includes the structure of tags 
allowed and/or required. Further restrictions that can be expressed in a DTD concern the 
type of the attributes and default values to be used when no attribute value is provided. 
An XML schema itself is, an XML document defining the valid structure of an XML 
document in the spirit of a DTD. The elements used in a schema definition are of the type 
‘element’ and have attributes that are defining the restrictions already mentioned above. 
The information in such an element is a list of further element definitions that have to be 
nested inside the defined element. Furthermore, XML schema has some several 
characteristics, such as: support of basic data types, Constraints on attributes, type definition, 
name-space mechanism. This features enable to map data-models of applications from whose 
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information we want to share with others on an XML schema This procedure has a big 
potential in the actual exchanging of data. However, the user must to commit to our data-
model in order to make use of the information. Therefore, it lacks an important advantage 
of meta-information. XML is designed to provide an interchange format for weakly 
structured data by defining the underlying data-model in a schema and by using 
annotations, from the schema, in order to clarify the role of single statements. Two things 
are important in this claim from the information sharing point: XML has a 
syntactic/structural model and describes data on the object level, without semantic. 
In the research community was developed  a new language able to fill these gaps, the RDF 
standard proposed as a data model for representing meta-data about web pages and their 
content using an XML syntax. In RDF, a resource is expressed in terms of a triple (resource, 
property, value) [39]. The property is a two-placed relation that connects a resource to a 
certain value of that property. This value can be a simple data-type or a resource. 
Additionally, the value can be replaced by a variable representing a resource that is 
further described by nested triples making assertions about the properties of the resource 
that is represented by the variable. Furthermore, RDF allows multiple values for a single 
property. For this purpose, the model contains three built-in data types called collections, 
namely an unordered lists (bag), ordered lists (seq), and sets of alternatives (alt) 
providing some kind of an aggregation mechanism. A further requirement arising from the 
nature of the web is the need to avoid name-clashes that might occur when referring to 
different web-sites that use different RDF-models to annotate meta-data. RDF defines 
name-spaces for this purpose. Name-spaces are defined by referring to an URL that 
provides the names and connecting it to a source id that is then used to annotate each 
name in an RDF specification defining the origin of that particular name. 
However, if people want to share this information, there has to be an agreement on a 
standard core of vocabulary in terms of modeling primitives that should be used to 
describe meta-data. RDF schemes (RDF/S) attempt to provide such a standard vocabulary. 
RDF/S provides a notion of concepts (class), slots (property), inheritance (SubclassOf, 
SubslotOf) and range restrictions (Constraint Property). Unfortunately, no well-defined 
semantics exist for these modeling primitives in the current state. Further, parts such as 
the re-identification mechanism are not well defined even on an informal level. Lastly, 
there is no reasoning support available, not even for property inheritance.  
Before we have seen that XML defines structures as well, except there are no sophisticated 
mechanism for mapping different structures. RDF is designed to provide some information 
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on the semantic level, by enabling us to include meta-information in the description of a 
web-page. But RDF doesn’t provide semantic descriptions. Rather it provides a common 
syntax and a basic vocabulary that can be used when describing this meta-data. 
Fortunately, the designers of RDF are aware that there is a strong need for an additional 
‘logical level’ which defines a clear semantics for RDF-expressions and provides a basis for 
integration mechanisms. 
XML and especially XML schemata are suitable for exchange data with a well defined 
syntax and structure. Simple RDF provides a uniform syntax for exchanging meta-
information in a machine-readable format. However, in their current state neither XML 
nor RDF provides sufficient support for the integration of heterogeneous structures or 
different meanings of terms. There is a need for semantic modeling and reasoning about 
structure and meaning.  
 
2.2 Semantic Formal Language 
 
The term ’Ontology’ [40] has been used in many ways and across different communities. In 
general, each person has an individual view on the world and the things he/she has to deal 
with every day. However, there is a common basis of understanding in terms of the 
language we use to communicate with each other. Terms from natural language can 
therefore, be assumed to be a shared vocabulary relying on a (mostly) common 
understanding of certain concepts with very little variety. These conceptualizations 
provide a terminology that can be used for communication between people. The example 
of our natural language demonstrates, that a conceptualization cannot be universally valid, 
but rather a limited number of persons committed to that particular conceptualization. 
This fact is reflected in the existence of different languages which differ even more 
(English and Japanese) or much less (German and Dutch). Confusion can become worse 
when we are considering terminologies developed for a special scientific or economic 
areas. In these cases, we often find situations where one term refers to different 
phenomena. The consequence of this confusion is, a separation into different groups, that 
share terminology and its conceptualization. These groups are then called information 
communities. The main problem with the use of a shared terminology according to a 
specific conceptualization of the world is that much information remains implicit. When a 
mathematician talks about a binomial normal he is referring to a wider scope than just the 
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formula itself. Possibly, he will also consider its interpretation (the number of subsets of a 
certain size) and its potential uses (e. g. estimating the chance of winning in a lottery). 
Ontologies set out to overcome this problem of implicit and hidden knowledge by making 
the conceptualization of a domain (e. g. mathematics) explicit. This corresponds to one of 
the definitions of the term ontology most popular in computer science [41]: An ontology is 
an explicit specification of a conceptualization. An ontology is used to make assumptions 
about the meaning of a term available. It can also be viewed an explication, of the context a 
term, it is normally used in [42] for example, describes context in terms of twelve 
independent dimensions that have to be know in order to understand a piece of 
knowledge completely.  There are many different ways in which an ontology may explicate 
a conceptualization and the corresponding context knowledge. Jasper and Uschold [43] 
distinguish two ways in which the mechanisms for the specification of context knowledge 
by an ontology can be compared:   
• Level of Formality: The specification of a conceptualization and its implicit context 
knowledge, can be done at different levels of formality. As already mentioned 
above, a glossary of terms can also be seen as an ontology, despite its purely 
informal character. A first step to gain more formality, is to describe a structure to 
be used for the description. A good example of this approach is the standard web 
annotation language XML (see section ). The DTD is an ontology describing the 
terminology of a web page on a low level of formality. Unfortunately, the rather 
informal character of XML encourages its misuse. While the hierarchy of an XML 
specification was originally designed to describe a layout, it can also be exploited to 
represent sub-type hierarchies, [44] which may lead to confusion. Fortunately, this 
problem can be solved by assigning formal semantics to the structures used for the 
description of the ontology. However, a formalization is only available for the 
structural part of a specification. Assertions about terms and the description of 
dynamic knowledge is not formalized which offers total freedom for a description.  
• Extend of Explication: The other comparison criterion is, the extend of explication 
that is reached by the ontology. This criterion is strongly connected with the 
expressive power of the specification language used. We already mentioned DTD’s 
which are mainly a simple hierarchy of terms. Furthermore, we can generalize this 
by saying that, the least expressive specification of an ontology consists of an 
organization of terms in a network using two-placed relations. The idea of this goes 
back to the use of semantic networks in the seventies. Many extensions of the basic 
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idea examined have been proposed. One of the most influential ones was, the use of 
roles that could be filled out by entities showing a certain type [94]. This kind of 
value restriction can still be found in recent approaches. RDF schema descriptions 
[95] which might become a new standard for the semantic descriptions of web-
pages, are an example of this. An RDF schema contains class definitions with 
associated properties that can be restricted by so called constraint-properties. 
However, default values and value range descriptions are not expressive enough to 
cover all possible conceptualizations. A more expressive power can be provided by 
allowing classes to be specified by logical formulas. These formulas can be 
restricted to a decidable subset of first order logic. This is the approach of 
description logics [96]. 
 
2.2.1 The ontology 
 
Ontologies are useful for many different applications, which has different requirements on 
the level of formality and the extend of explication provided by the ontology. Information 
communities are useful because they ease communication and cooperation among 
members with the use of shared terminology with well defined meaning. On the other 
hand, the formalization of information communities makes communication between 
members from different information communities very difficult. Generally, because they 
do not agree on a common conceptualization. This situation demands for an explication 
and explanation of the use of terminology. Informal ontologies with a large extend of 
explication are a good choice to overcome these problems. While definitions have always 
played an important role in scientific literature, conceptual models of certain domains are 
rather new. Nowadays systems analysis and related fields like software engineering, rely 
on conceptual modeling to communicate structure and details of a problem domain as well 
as the proposed solution between domain experts and engineers. Prominent examples of 
ontologies used for communication are Entity-Relationship diagrams and Object-oriented 
Modeling languages such as UML [97]. ER-diagrams as well as UML are not only used for 
communication, they also serve as building plans for data and systems guiding the process 
of building (engineering) the system. The use of ontologies for the description of 
information and systems has many benefits. The ontology can be used to identify 
requirements as well as inconsistencies in a chosen design. Further, it can help to acquire 
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or search for available information. Once a systems component has been implemented, its 
specification can be used for maintenance and extension purposes. Another very 
challenging application of ontology-based specification is the reuse of existing software. In 
this case, the specifying ontology serves as a basis to decide if an existing component 
matches the requirements of a given task. Depending on the purpose of the specification, 
ontologies of different formal strength and expressiveness are to be utilized. While the 
process of communication design decisions and the acquisition of additional information 
normally benefit from rather informal and expressive ontology representations (often 
graphical), the directed search for information needs a rather strict specification with a 
limited vocabulary to limit the computational effort. At the moment, the support of 
semiautomatic software reuse seems to be one of the most challenging applications of 
ontologies, because it requires expressive ontologies with a high level of formal strength. 
The previously discussed considerations might provoke the impression that the benefits of 
ontologies are limited to systems analysis and design. However, an important application 
area of ontologies is the integration of existing systems. The ability to exchange 
information at run time, also known as interoperability, is an valid and important topic. 
The attempt to provide interoperability suffers from problems similar to those associated 
with the communication amongst different information communities. The important 
difference being the actors are not people able to perform abstraction and common sense 
reasoning about the meaning of terms, but machines. In order to enable machines to 
understand each other, we also have to explicate the context of each system on a much 
higher level of formality.  
Each system that wants to inter-operate with other has to transfer its data information 
into this common framework. Interoperability is achieved by explicitly considering 
contextual knowledge in the translation process.  
As reported in [29] some ontologies are diffused in scientific literature. A common domain 
ontology describes the semantics of the domain in the SIMS mediator [45], in which  all 
terms of a domain are arranged in a complex structure. Each information source is related 
to the terms of the global ontology. However, the scalability of such a fixed and static 
common domain model is low [46], because the kind of information sources which can be 
integrated in the future is limited. In OBSERVER [47] and SKC [46] it is assumed, that a 
predefined ontology for each information source exists. Consequently, new information 
sources can easily be added and removed. But  the ontologies use their own vocabulary. In 
MESA [35] the third hybrid approach is used. Each source is related to its source ontology. 
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In order to make the source ontologies comparable, a common global vocabulary is used, 
organized in a common domain ontology. This hybrid approach provides the biggest 
flexibility because new sources can easily be integrated and, in contrast to the 
decentralized approach, the source ontologies remain comparable. 
 
 
2.3 Semantic Technologies 
 
The World Wide Web represents a huge repository of information which can be retrieved 
and used. Unfortunately, information is represented with no meaning associated, since the 
meaning of retrieved information can be (re-)established only in the process of 
interpreting the information by humans. As a result, information scattered throughout the 
current (and traditional) version of the web is almost totally useless for software, non-
human users (machine agents). 
In attempt to respond to this situation, the term “Semantic Web” was coined by Tim 
Berners-Lee  [49] referring to a “web for machines” as opposed to a web to be read by 
humans. In their understanding, “The Semantic Web is an extension of the current web in 
which information is given well-defined meaning, better enabling computers and people to 
work in cooperation” (Figure 4) 
 
 
Figure 4 Semantic web layers 
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The Semantic Web is the opportunity for providing, finding and processing information via 
the Internet with the help of (machine) agents which are capable of dealing with the 
semantics of the information. The idea is to transform information into something 
meaningful to actors who seek to enhance their knowledge in order to satisfy a specific 
concern or accomplish a specific task related to their particular context.  
The vision of the Semantic Web is based on the employment of semantic technologies that 
allow the meaning of information and the meaning of associations between information to 
be known and processed at execution time. To fulfil the promises and enable semantic 
technologies to work, there must be a knowledge model (of some part) of the world that is 
used to provide meaning to information to be processed within an application. The 
knowledge model has the form of a semantic model which differs from other kind of 
models [50]: 
• Connections: The meaning of terms, or concepts, in the model is established by the 
way they connect to each other. 
• Multiple views: a semantic model expresses multiple viewpoints and several 
interconnected models could be used to represent different aspects. 
• Sharing: semantic models represent knowledge about the world in which systems 
operate and are shared across applications. 
• Reasoning capability: use of a model is referred to as “reasoning over the model”. 
The reasoning can range from  graph search to intricate inferencing. 
 
Although the role of a semantic model can be played by a simple taxonomy, nowadays use 
of semantically richer ontologies (ontological models) dominates. 
New knowledge can be derived by examining the connections between concepts. Simple 
ontologies are just connections, richer ontologies include rules and constraints governing 
these connections. The semantic web is not so much a technology as an infrastructure, 
enabling the creation of meaning through standards, mark-up languages, and related 
processing tools. To represent ontologies in a formal way, several languages can be used. 
The Semantic Web principles are implemented in the layers of Web technologies and 
standards. The most common ontology languages are briefly described follow. 
At the beginning, the idea of the semantic web tried just to enhance the current version of 
the web. It started out with a document oriented approach. The basic idea was to make 
web pages identifiable by computers as information resources carrying not only 
information (readable only by humans) but the meaning of this information as well. 
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Ontologies in this thesis  define a shared conceptualization of the application domain at 
hand and provide the basis for defining metadata, that have a precisely defined semantics, 
and that are therefore machine-processable.  
Advanced applications can use ontologies to relate the information to a semantic model of 
a given domain. In this way semantic technologies offer a new way to integrate different 
applications. Nowadays, the field of semantic interoperability is the most addressed 
problem connected with the idea of the semantic web. 
 
2.4 Ontology representations 
 
Most of languages can be used to represent ontologies; many of them evolved from 
creation of ontology construction methodologies. The Open Knowledge Base Connectivity 
(OKBC) [51] model and languages like “Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF)” [52] are 
examples that have become the bases of other ontology languages.  
Several languages use frame logic which is basically an object-oriented approach defining 
frames and attributes (classes and properties). There are also several languages based on 
description logic, e.g. Loom [53], DAML+OIL [71], or later evolved Web Ontology Language 
(OWL) [55] standard. 
Representation languages can be divided in terms of different abstraction levels used to 
structure the representation itself: 
• Extensional level: the model is formulated by specifying every object from the 
domain. 
• Intentional level: objects are defined by means of (necessary and sufficient) 
conditions for belonging to the domain. 
• Meta-level: concepts from intentional level are abstracted, higher level concepts 
are specified, and previous concepts are seen as instances of new meta-concepts. 
 
Some issues emerge from analysis of ontology representation, concerning the scope and 
modality of context expression: these criteria  consider the basic formal nature of 
languages and that various languages deal with the representation of incomplete 
information in different way: 
 
• Class and relations: languages aiming at representing objects, classes and relations. 
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• Actions and processes: languages that provide specialized representation structures 
for describing dynamic characteristics of the domain, such as actions, processes, 
and workflows (they usually can represent static aspects of domain too, but only in 
elementary level). 
• Everything: languages that may be used for any kind of contexts and applications. 
 
The context can be expressed in the following ways: 
• Programming languages: allow representation and manipulation of data in 
several ways and according to various paradigms, leading to a cleaner separation 
between data structures and algorithms that handle them. Object oriented 
paradigm is preferred in recent years. This approach is generally associated with a 
number of concepts, such as complex objects, object identity, methods, 
encapsulation, typing and inheritance. Example can be language F-logic [56], logical 
formalism that tries to capture the features of object-oriented approaches to 
computation and data representation. F-Logic forms the core of systems such as 
Ontobroker [57]. 
• Conceptual and semantic database models: semantic (or conceptual) models 
were introduced as schema design tools. Examples of proposed semantic data 
models are ER and Extended ER data model, FDM (Functional data model), SDM 
(Semantic Data Model). Semantic models provide more powerful abstractions for 
the specification of databases. 
• Information system/software formalisms: here belong different formalisms for 
information system design, especially in object-oriented design. Most widely used 
formalism is Unified Modelling Language (UML). UML was designed for human-to-
human communication of models for building systems in object-oriented 
programming languages. Over the years its use has been extended to a variety of 
different aims, including the design of databases schemas, XML document schemas, 
and knowledge models. 
• Logic-based: very important class of languages is based on logic. Such languages 
express a domain-ontology in terms of the classes of objects that are of interest in 
the domain, as well as the relevant relationships holding among such classes. These 
languages have a formal well-defined semantics. Three different types of logic-
based languages exist – languages based on first-order predicate logic (e.g. KIF 
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[52]), languages based on description logics (e.g. OWL [55]), and process-action 
specification languages (e.g. PSL [58]).  
• Frame-based: frame is a data structure that provides a representation of an object 
or a class of objects or a general concept or predicate. Some systems define only a 
single type of frame, other have two or more types, such as class frames and 
instance frames. The slots of a frame describe attributes of represented concept. 
They may also have other components in addition to the slot name, value and value 
restrictions, for instance the name of a procedure than can be used to compute the 
value of the slot – facets. Frames are usually organized into taxonomies. Through 
taxonomic relations, classes may be described as specializations of more generic 
classes with inheritance capability. Frame-based ontology languages were often 
used in many knowledge-based applications, like Ontolingua [59], OCML [60], 
OKBC [61] or XOL [62].  
• Graph-based: formalisms based on various kinds of graph based or graph-oriented 
notations. Semantic networks [63] and conceptual graphs [64] originated from the 
Artificial Intelligence community. OML/CKML (Conceptual Knowledge Mark-up 
Language) [65] is a framework and mark-up language for knowledge and ontology 
representation based on conceptual graphs. Topic Maps [66] are recent proposal 
originated from the XML community. 
• XML-related formalisms: XML [67] is a tag-based language for describing tree 
structures with a linear syntax and it is a standard language for exchange of 
information in the Web. Given the popularity of XML in exchange of information, 
XML-related languages have been considered as suitable for ontology 
representation. Important languages are based on Resource Description 
Framework (RDF) [68]. These provide a foundation for processing metadata about 
documents. 
 
The expression can be interpreted in single model and several model. In the first case, 
ontology should be interpreted in such a way that only one model of the corresponding 
logical theory is a good interpretation of the formal description. In the other one, ontology 
should be interpreted as specifying what we know about the domain with the reservation 
that the amount of knowledge we have about the domain can be limited (e.g. first-order 
logic based languages). 
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2.4.1 Semantic Web Ontology languages 
 
Description Logics (DLs) are a family of logic-based knowledge representation formalisms 
designed to represent and reason about the knowledge of an application domain in a 
structured and well understood way. The basic notions in DLs are concepts and roles, which 
denote sets of objects and binary relations, respectively. Most of today’s semantic web 
ontology languages are DL-based. Also many of them are XML-related, or they possible XML 
notation. Several ontology languages have been designed for use in the web. Among them, the 
most important are OIL [69], DAML-ONT [70] and DAML+OIL [71]. More recently, a new 
language, OWL [55], is being developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Web 
Ontology Working Group, which had to maintain as much compatibility as possible with pre-
existing languages and is intended to be proposed as the standard Semantic Web ontology 
language. The idea of the semantic Web is to annotate web pages with machine-interpretable 
description of their content. In such a context, ontologies are expected to help automated 
processes to access information, providing structured vocabularies that explicate the 
relationships between different terms.  
 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) [67] - was widely accepted and used as a convenient 
information representation and exchange format. XML itself don’t carry semantics, but is 
serves as the base syntax for the leading ontology languages that we shall survey. Later 
additions like XML-DTD (Document Type Definition) and XML-Schema, added some syntactic 
rules like enumerations, cardinality constrains, and data types, but still lacked even simple 
semantics like inheritance. The purpose of XML Schema is therefore to declare a set of 
constraints that an XML document has to satisfy in order to be validated. With respect to DTD, 
however, XML Schema provides a considerable improvement, as the possibility to define 
much more elaborated constraints on how different part of an XML document fit together, 
more sophisticated nesting rules, data-typing. Moreover, XML-Schema expresses shared 
vocabularies and allows machines to carry out rules made by people. Among a large number 
of other rather complicated features.  
 
Resource Description Framework (RDF) [68] is a standard way for defining of simple 
descriptions. RDF is for semantics - a clear set of rules for providing simple descriptive 
information. RDF enforces a strict notation for the representation of information, based on 
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resources and relations between them. As referred to in its name, RDF strength is in its 
descriptive capabilities, but is still lacks some important features required in an ontology 
language such as inferences for example. However, ontology languages built on top of RDF as 
a representation and description format. The RDF data model provides three object types: 
resources, properties, and statements. Resource may be either entire Web page, a part of it, a 
whole collection of pages or an object that is not directly accessible via the Web, property is a 
specific aspect, characteristic attribute, or relation used to describe a resource, statement is a 
triple consisting of two nodes and a connecting edge. These basic elements are all kinds of 
RDF resources. According to the latter description, a subject is a resource that can be 
described by some property. The predicate defines the type of property that is being 
attributed. Finally, the object is the value of the property associated with the subject.  
RDF Schema (RDFS) [62] enriches the basic RDF model, by providing a vocabulary for RDF, 
which is assumed to have certain semantics. Predefined properties can be used to model 
instance of and subclass of relationships as well as domain restrictions and range restrictions 
of attributes. Indeed, the RDF schema provides modelling primitives that can be used to 
capture basic semantics in a domain neutral way. That is, RDFS specifies metadata that is 
applicable to the entities and their properties in all domains. The metadata then serves as a 
standard model by which RDF tools can operate on specific domain models, since the RDFS 
meta-model elements will have a fixed semantics in all domain models. RDFS provides simple 
but powerful modelling primitives for structuring domain knowledge into classes and sub 
classes, properties and sub properties, and can impose restrictions on the domain and range 
of properties, and defines the semantics of containers. 
 
Web Ontology Language (OWL) The next layer in the Semantic Web architecture is Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) [55], a language for Web ontologies definition and instantiation. 
OWL enhances RDF vocabulary for describing properties and classes: relations between 
classes (e.g. subclasses), cardinality, equality, richer typing of properties, characteristics of 
properties (e.g. symmetry) and instances. OWL is the W3C recommendation for ontology 
definition, but other standards also support similar characteristics (DAML+OIL). Several tools 
support modelling with OWL and DAML+OIL. The OWL language also provides three 
increasingly expressive sublanguages: OWL Lite, OWL DL, and OWL Full, each offers a 
different level of expressiveness at the trade-off for simplicity, thus offering a suitable sub 
language parts available for use according to needs. There also exists OWL based 
enhancement to web services oriented languages, aiming to handle semantic descriptions of 
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such services. OWL-S [73] is framework for containing and sharing ontological description of 
the capabilities and characteristics of a Web service.  
An OWL-S specification includes three sub-ontologies that define essential types of knowledge 
about a service – service profile describes the outlining interface and characteristics of the 
service, a process profile defines the control flow of the service and the service grounding 
provides mapping with communication-level protocols. OWL-S has similar characteristics 
with a number of related protocols. The popularity of OWL-S in the Semantic Web community, 
as Web services description language, adds to the attractiveness of the language. 
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Chapter 3 
The State of Art and motivation  
In this section, he motivation of this thesis will be described  according to the state of the art, 
limitations and research open issues.  
 
3.1 Physical and Logical security convergence  
 
Security is a word that generates negative sensations in most people’s minds. It describes  the  
uncertainty of the safety of their property or themselves. The evolution of technologies and 
infrastructure has added more complexity in the world of security. Now the threats come 
from different sources, internally and externally (crime).  As described in Section 1.5 most 
system infrastructures include different kind of physical sensors and that provides an strong 
issues for information and integration management. The scientific community has addressed 
more effort for the introduction of new solutions. Different sensors provides different alarms 
or events each of them is managed separately without an shared information sharing 
methodology.  For example, in a surveillance system the object detection and motion 
detection of a single cameras can be improved by other event and measures coming from 
adjacent cameras or sensors (e.g. audio surveillance system). In video analytics applications, 
the object detection and tracking performed by the single camera can be improved by means 
of additional information from other cameras or sensors ([17],[18],[19]). For example in case 
of occlusion or evacuation. The use of sensors correlation has three important objectives: 
• Reduce the False Alarm rate and improve the Probability of Detection; 
• Extend the capabilities of a monitoring system in order to cover the user requirements 
• Manage the limitation of detection of a single sensors. 
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In literature are present most architecture that proposes a solution for physical security 
information integration, but some of them are for a specific kind of devices [20], some of them 
proposes also a technique for the reasoning [21], based on attack scenarios but they not are so 
scalable and extensible. The most popular  are PSIM (Physical Security Information Management) 
system [22]. As described in [23] the PSIM are composed by: 
• Data  Gathering: Device  level  information  gathered  from  a  broad  range  of   
disparate  security  systems (video surveillance, intrusion detection, access control, 
environment sensors, etc…) that  includes devices from different vendors 
• Data  Evaluation: The  PSIM  software  should  have  the  ability  to  evaluate  the   
information  that  is  gathered  and  based  upon  analytical  algorithms,  identify  and   
prioritise,  real  incidents  or  situations 
• Confirmation: The  monitored  ‘situation’  should  be  presented  to   a  system  
operator   in  a  clear,  concise,  yet  comprehensive  format, enabling  an  accurate  and  
speedy  response to  a  ‘confirmed’  security  incident. 
• Resolution: The  PSIM  system  software  should  facilitate  the  presentation  of  
logically   displayed  and  clearly  communicated  actions  that  the  Security  Operators  
should  carry   out  when  managing  a  real  time   incident  or  situation.   
• Reporting: All  activity   should  be monitored  and  ‘recorded’,  including  all  Operator   
actions,   to  aid  compliance  management,  provide  training   scenarios  and  as  an   
auditable  record  of  activity  subsequent  to  a  security  incident 
 
But there is an other problem and issues in this system that has widespread in the last year, 
the logical security [24]. 
All asset and information about them are accessible from the inside by approved network 
access, without proper control mechanism they can be also accessed physically by insider. In 
the literature there are many works about the consideration of physical and logical security. 
As described in [25] often the areas of physical security and information technology security 
are worlds apart. Because these functions are in place and because they at least in part 
achieve their goals, management tends to perceive that major risks they try to mitigate are 
being addressed. Physical security systems and devices, process control systems, and IT 
infrastructures are being integrated without sufficient consideration of the security risks that 
the increasing intermingling of these systems and infrastructures introduces. For Instance, 
security system are distributed and composed by sensors that are physically separated from 
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other components such as central processors. Networks are used to connect these physically 
separated components. At the same time, information technology (IT) are composed by large 
numbers of workstations, servers, network devices, and networks that not only connect 
internal hosts and devices to each other, but also provide intranet and extranet connectivity. 
IT infrastructures are dynamic and their functionalities are out of control.  But today, few 
paper s faces this problem. One first is written by the National Research Council during 2002, 
which described the failure of regional transmission grid. It could be happen by the damage of 
critical component failed in cascade manner due to their interconnection pointed [26].  In [27] 
some case of convergence are presented and it gives some recommendations concerning how 
to do so, but it did not specify the  issue of vulnerabilities resulting from the convergence of 
physical security and their systems with IT infrastructures. 
In [25] Schultz analyses the problems to give information security professionals a high level 
view of the physical convergence problem. It declares that research funding agencies would 
be well-advised to start soliciting research proposals in this area and to provide funding to 
researchers who appear capable of delivering promising research results related to ways of 
effectively identifying and mitigating physical convergence- related security risks. As the 
National Research Council asserted, special systems as well as other types of systems 
connected to the same networks provide a target rich environment for would-be evildoers. 
Research can and will provide answers to many of the issues that must be addressed.  
The main problem of physical and logical security starts from the enterprises department 
separation.  Physical security systems are in the scope of a physical security department that 
assesses and mitigates risks in large part resulting from the necessity of allowing physical 
access to employees, contractors, and visitors. In the same time, physical security systems 
have evolved considerably in terms of sophisticated computing systems connected to 
networks, physical security staff members are not likely to have much training and knowledge 
in computing and networking, let alone information security. 
The IT department is responsible to ensure that the infrastructure and components are in 
place and operating efficiently. IT staff have considerable knowledge concerning 
computing, networking, and programming but not about physical security 
and physical security systems. Physical security and IT security are typically also very 
disparate functions. 
Security-related risks associated with deploying systems and devices used to physical security 
and to support process control are increasing because progressively more they are connected 
to networks. In the past it was not a problem, the physical system was isolated, simple, and 
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protected by physical security measures. The connection and the openness to networks 
provides different security risks that costly and disruptive security- related incidents could 
easily result. An attacker can access locally or remotely to target of the systems and to devices. 
The potential for unauthorized remote access now is  an high problem exists due to network 
connection.  
According to IMS Research, which estimates the Internet-capable equipment, devices 
connected to an Internet Network can pass from the 5 billion milestone in 2010, to  22 billion 
by 2020. This assumption reflects the spread of personal devices such as Smartphone and 
tablet computers, and also includes all the sensors, cameras, and devices used in security that 
are now IP-enabled because of the convergence of the IP network. This can have a bad impact 
on network performance and security. This situation reveals new security challenges, the 
convergence of  Internet-connected devices, voice, video, and data also provides ways to 
integrate logical and physical security. 
In [3] this problem is introduced by CISCO enterprise. It declares that the lack of integration 
creates the following challenges: 
• No single system to identify a person’s identity because each functional security 
department controls its own identity database 
• Increased potential for theft 
• Lack of IT management and application of best practices applied to physical security 
devices, or a lack of best practices applied consistently across departments or 
organizations 
• Lack of physical monitoring of logical security devices that can detect tampering; that 
is, unauthorized access to a logical security device console 
 
Obviously, a convergence methodologies requires different efforts for network connection 
because increases the data traffic, for installation device for the detection of malicious attacks 
and etc..    
 
3.2 Complex Event Processing 
 
 
A complex monitoring system for the infrastructure protection managing different 
information  has the objective to detect events that can be occurred and determinate the 
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situations corresponding to these events trough opportune procedures. This kind of 
application are called event-driven detection system.  
One of the main research field involved in these kind of application if the Complex Event 
Processing (CEP) [8]. CEP addresses two important concepts in order to develop scalable and 
dynamic systems. The CEP have a double function provide information and process into 
events, but also it detect the relationship between events. Such as temporal correlation, by the 
definition of rules of correlation, called Event Pattern. Through the aggregation of single 
events can be generated more abstract events. CEP provides a separation coupling between 
basic events with a strong relationship to the semantics of the underlying technology  and 
complex events closer to the semantics of the application. Critical applications are 
interconnected and imposes event load to be processed by CEP system. CEP will be a tool to 
derive understandable information on the basis of a large number of events. 
In this context it is important to manage the event correlation in the presence of highly 
dynamic systems and support mechanisms for self-organization. Guaranteeing non-functional 
properties, such as, reliability, availability, performance, and security pose major challenges 
on the technical infrastructure. According to the application, specific complex event patterns 
should be developed despite of occurred events during the working time of the system. 
Regarding the physical security for infrastructure protection, the event correlation is useful 
for interpretation of complex event composed by simple event (event form single sub-
system/sensor). Correlation is the contemporary of event (temporal correlation), sequence of 
specific events. 
In literature ([9], [10], [12]) there are several approach and techniques for event correlation, 
the main are described following : 
• Rule-Based 
One of the approach to event correlation is the rule-based analysis. It is based on the 
combination of events, the rule engine analyzes data until it reaches the final state. 
In rule based event correlation, the system uses a set of predefined assumption to evaluate 
incoming observations until a conclusion is reached. The correlation ability depends on 
the depth and capability of the rule set. In a rule based event correlation engine, 
information is represented in three levels [9]: 
o Knowledge level: Domain-specific expert information is available in a 
knowledge base, which is the rule repository. 
o Data level: Information about the problem at hand is allocated in the working 
memory. At this level, facts are stored. 
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o Control level: The response about how to apply the rules from the knowledge 
base to solve a given problem is located at the inference engine. 
 
Typically, rule-based systems have a offline execution mode. 
For very accurate results it is needed of expert knowledge in order to respect the criteria 
and update the rules in case of changes. 
 
• State Transition Based 
Finite State Machine [11] are most used in computer science for their power and easiness. 
It allows to describe the behaviour and states of a system. the sequence of events it is 
defines as a state transition,  a state of system is reached after a sequence of events. It 
allow efficient and effective computation. But due to the complexity of new systems make 
difficult to model them in details and some are allows abstractions. Many solutions 
consider the use of artificial intelligence, graph theory, neural networks, information 
theory, and automata theory. For instance, Finite State Machines represent a type of 
models which can be applied to model-based event correlation approaches. Deep 
knowledge of the system may describe its structure (static knowledge) and function 
(dynamic knowledge). Finite State Machine have been considered in some work on 
diagnosis of Discrete Event Systems (DES) [12]. Machines called diagnosers are 
automatically synthesised and are able, under some conditions, to detect the occurrence of 
unobservable events at runtime. The goal of the diagnoser is to infer the presence of 
alarms or interesting situation  from the sequence of observed events. The diagnoser is a 
Finite State Machine that is built from the model of the system, which is also assumed to 
be a Finite State Machine. At runtime, the diagnoser observes the behaviour of the system 
and estimates the state which it has reached. The diagnoser possesses information about 
the possible failures in the different states of the system and can detect them in a finite 
time. The advantage of FSM based event correlation is the formally definition and 
automation. On the other hand  it requires the availability of system behaviours of the 
which is unfortunately rarely in practice. 
 
• Model Based 
Model Based Correlation uses a model of the physical world to represent the structure and 
behaviour of the system under observation, as an inference method. It is not an approach 
or  technique, but a paradigm instead. It has a connection with rule based systems, it is not 
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as a rule based system because it specifies a system model, with events as consequences of 
certain model states and transitions, while rule based system specifies event patterns as 
conditions for certain actions.  
 
• Classification Based 
It classifies an event in a predefined class. The most popular technique is the Support 
Vector machine for classification [14]. The input is a vector contains a low level features, 
from that is able to detected high level concepts. An other approach is the Bayesian 
network [15]. It is an acyclic graph which models probabilistic relations, e.g. between the 
threats and the primitive events detected by sensors. It requires well defined a-priory and 
conditional probabilities of the. An other most popular approach is  Artificial Neural 
Network [16]. It models in artificial mode the work of  human brain. The node of network 
performs operations on weighted inputs to get an output. The processing can be 
performed by different techniques (mathematical, temporal, etc.). it is able to solve 
complex problems, but the selection of a suitable network architecture can be difficult and 
the training can take lot of time. 
 
 
3.3 Decision Support System 
 
Decision support systems (DSS) are interactive, computer-based systems that help to 
choose activities countermeasures. They provide traditional information access (data 
storage) and retrieval functions with support for model building and model-based 
reasoning. Typical application areas of DSSs are management and planning in business, 
health care, the military, and any area in which management will encounter complex 
decision situations.  
As described in [28] a typical DSS id composed by: 
• Database management system (DBMS). A DBMS serves as a data bank for the DSS. It 
stores large quantities of data that are relevant to the class of problems for which the 
DSS has been designed and provides logical data structures (as opposed to the physical 
data structures) with which the users interact. A DBMS separates the users from the 
physical aspects of the database structure and processing. It should also be capable of 
informing the user of the types of data that are available and how to gain access to 
them. 
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• Model-base management system (MBMS). The role of MBMS is analogous to that of a 
DBMS. Its primary function is providing independence between specific models that 
are used in a DSS from the applications that use them. The purpose of an MBMS is to 
transform data from the DBMS into information that is useful in decision making. Since 
many problems that the user of a DSS will cope with may be unstructured, the MBMS 
should also be capable of assisting the user in model building. 
• Dialog generation and management system (DGMS). The main product of an 
interaction with a DSS is insight. As their users are often managers who are not 
computer-trained, DSSs need to be equipped with intuitive and easy-to-use interfaces. 
These interfaces aid in model building, but also in interaction with the model, such as 
gaining insight and recommendations from it. The primary responsibility of a DGMS is 
to enhance the ability of the system user to utilize and benefit from the DSS. In the 
remainder of this article, we will use the broader term user interface rather than 
DGMS. 
 
A DSS in order to provide a decision-making process shall have an high-qualitiy and 
unambiguous information integration. The semantic web assure the integration of 
information coming from different source and the transformation of DSS in a SematicWeb-
DSS. But these systems do not have reasoning and integration of incomplete information 
capabilities [106], [107]. The scope of this thesis is to improve the capabilities of DSS in order 
to cover the limitations. 
 
 
3.3.1 Semantic and Ontological models in DSS and data integration 
 
New open standards  are widespread in order to define techniques for cooperative 
environments. They are based on the adoption of common data models to formally define 
and represent data knowledge. For instance,  the Open Geospatial Consortium provides as 
data model  an XML schema (the Sensor Model Language) for defining geometric, dynamic 
and observational characteristics of sensors and other standards as Observation and 
Measurement to describe observed phenomenon [29]. This standard provide some 
general information on sensors for data discovery, processes and analyzes measurement 
of sensors, localizes the sensors, provides information about performance (e.g. threshold, 
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accuracy). But, as aforementioned before, these standards focus on syntactic aspect for the 
interoperability and not on semantic form. 
  
The semantic enriched data model and ontological model instead grant interoperability 
among multi-technology systems, providing a formal model for the integration of data 
gathered by different and heterogeneous sources. A formal data model specifies data 
relations, terminology and meanings, it is implemented through a set of ontologies 
formally described in OWL (Web Ontology Language) . Furthermore, the use of ontological 
models provides advantages in the use of web services architecture, the most popular and 
used in critical infrastructure applications. 
The integration and interoperability among heterogeneous data can be done for: 
• Overcame syntactic technical heterogeneity; 
• Overcame semantic ambiguities and interpretation; 
• Deliver re-usable application and components for different domain 
• Evaluate the meaning of phenomena and observation from temporal, spatial and 
thematic perspective. 
 
In literature are available some models for interoperability, which provide syntactic 
integration but not semantic relations. One of this is the  Sensor Web Enablement (SWE) 
[30] , a suite of specifications to model sensor characteristics and services. In the suite are 
included a Sensor Model Language(Sensor ML), an Observation & Measurement and 
Sensor Observation Service. They allow to model sensor and sensor observations, data 
retrieval mechanism. Furthermore it is possible to specify information as coordinates and 
timestamps, but they provide static representation of data without give details on data 
meaning of sensor observations, the evaluation of the phenomena situation awareness 
[31].  
In [30] is proposed the SSW framework, a fisrt definition of sensor Web, in which there is a 
first attempt of semantic annotation to existing standard sensor languages of the SWE, in 
order to increase interoperability and provide contextual information for situation 
awareness.  
Several attempts have been done in the data modelling field in terms of different 
ontologies. For instance in [32] a data combination and relation as an ontology. In [33] a 
sensor network ontology is presented with semantic  representation of information.  In 
 52 
order to assure the interoperability among monitoring system and integration of data 
source, different methodologies have been developed.  
Nowadays solution for interoperability and integration exist, but a proposal architecture 
comprising phenomena observation, interoperability, integration of different data, 
detection of dangerous events, does not exist yet.  
The use of ontology model is needed in order to give a shared, semantic model for the 
information process. 
Many works have demonstrated that increment of precision in service discovery  in 
presence of semantic representation. 
In this work it is defined a common data model to describe data information and 
observation. 
The proposed model is in RDF language and it is compliant with the Semantic Sensor Web 
[21][22] approach, too. 
The adoption of an ontology helps to fuse data and meaning, so, for the model description, 
we adopted open standards for interoperability, enriched with semantic information. In 
fact, a semantic based technology allows us to deal with raw data and manage them as a 
global Knowledge Base, we obtained an explicit representation of the meaning of data and 
services that is useful for extracting relevant information and for integrating them. The 
knowledge can be managed as a database that can be queried in a structured way enabling 
advanced operation as logic reasoning. Furthermore, it is possible to enforce consistency 
verification on modelled data to verify the compliance to the model and the acceptability 
of sensed value 
 
In the literature, some semantic approaches to manage heterogeneous data from sensors 
are available and some semantic decision models are beginning to be used ([98], [99]).  In 
[100] an architecture for sensor information description and processing, named semantic 
web architecture for sensor network (SWASN), is proposed. The architecture is based on 
four layers: the first is the physical level composed by different sensor networks. Each 
sensor networks manage its own data format. The data are processed in an ontology layer, 
in which each network has a local ontology. A global ontology is built upon a common 
vocabulary and it is processed in the semantic layer for the knowledge extraction, through 
inference and semantic reasoning. Finally, at user level, it is possible to query the ontology 
in order to process and elaborate data. In this case, the architecture proposed is 
responsible to process data semantically and then a client can request them for post 
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elaboration, there is no in-line event detection. Similar architectures are presented in 
[101], [102], [103] and [104]. In particular,[101] and [103], an automatic process for 
transformation of XML data into RDF is proposed, the transformation process is driven by 
semantic reasoning and mapping rules. The transformation is in real-time but not any 
detection system is proposed. In [104], a middleware architecture to manage event 
detection in real-time is presented, this is an architecture for automated, real-time, 
unsupervised annotation of low-level context features and corresponding mapping to 
high-level semantics. It enables the composition of simple rules through specific 
interfaces, which may launch a context aware system that will annotate content without 
the need for user technical expertise. The middleware has a semantic model only for the 
event management. There are no common models for the data acquired by sensor. The 
presented approaches use in-line techniques for semantic enrichment data model and in 
some case propose a model for in-line event detection. In this paper, we have proposed an 
improvement of these techniques in order to provide a semantic common data model for 
heterogeneous data interoperability, for real-time event detection with semantic model 
and a base for a development of a semantic DSS for post elaboration. 
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Chapter 4 
A smart decision support system based on fast classifier 
and semantic post reasoner  
 
 
 
In modern decision support systems there is the need to improve the performance in 
terms of detection, reliability and real time capabilities. These features are usually in 
inverse proportion. In this section we propose an innovative approach for a smart event 
detection and enriched phenomena comprehension. In particular, the proposed approach 
is based on a two steps process that tries to quickly identify an alarm and then elaborate 
the acquired knowledge base with a post reasoner to refine the final decision and give 
operators more feelings about the situation assessment and raised alarms. 
 
4.1 Why semantic model? 
 
 
In these complex scenario, not only smart surveillance and alert systems are needed but 
enriched decision support systems (DSS) are desirable. Such Systems, as described in 
section 3,  rely on heterogeneous data acquisition tools (sensors, video, historical and 
simulated data, …) and on data elaboration to prune non significant information; 
nevertheless, this is not enough as there is the need to interpret what data really 
represents to reduce false positives and detect even weak alarm conditions. In recent 
years, scientific world's attention has been devoted to both the information management 
with information and decision fusion approaches, and to the quantitative security 
estimation of these systems. On the other hand, to improve the situation assessment, it is 
possible to adopt different types of models for description of knowledge-base, event 
correlation and for the definition of the situation and threat identification. Very promising 
approaches are based on semantic and ontological models. 
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The semantic model can be used for understanding observed phenomena. In particular all 
sensors must share the same data model and the same interpretation of data. The data 
model must provide a syntactic interoperability mechanisms and procedures for semantic 
enrichment to build models in order to: 
 
o ensure a correct and shared information interpretation, 
o aggregate raw data into events (simple and composed), that will be used for 
the situation assessment before a final decision. 
 
In the literature some approaches for event detection and decision support based on 
semantic inference rules for phenomena comprehension are available. 
Nevertheless, due to the introduced overhead, the knowledge base is just inferred in 
offline mode. 
In this work we propose an innovative approach for smart event detection and enriched 
phenomena comprehension: the knowledge base will be inferred in real time, for the event 
detection, and a light smart classifier will raise an alarm.  
 
 
4.2 A model for monitoring system 
 
A monitoring system is, in general, a very complex architecture ([72], [76]) as it involves 
different components and subsystems that manage data and information in very different 
ways. 
In this section, we propose a data and a monitoring system models in order to cope with 
the complexity of heterogeneous data sources and to support the development of a 
reliable DSS. At a very course grain, it is composed of two main layers, namely the sensor 
network and the monitoring system, these are, in turn, modelled in deeper details to cope 
with such complexity. 
The proposed models enable to define simple data and atomic events coming from 
different sensors, it allows to model the complexity of the sensor network and the 
correlation among different events to define composed events to improve the knowledge 
about the system and locate critical scenarios. The proposed monitoring system models 
the detection system as a two steps process 
• a real-time reaction by means of a fast classifier 
 56 
• an offline activity through a semantic post reasoner. 
 
The former aiming at providing proper alarms when dangerous events occur, the latter 
aiming at providing a complete and detailed picture of the situation, useful for operators 
both in understanding the situation and for decision supporting. In next sections, we will 
illustrate the details about the system and data models and we will present an innovative 
architecture to implement the two steps detection strategy. In Figure 5 the model layers 
are reported. This structure helps to better represent the different features of the 
underlying sensor network and the monitoring and decisional approaches. 
 
Sensor network model  
 
This block models the physical sensor network responsible of the monitoring activity. The 
sensing elements can be various: wireless sensor networks, cameras, microphones, 
infrared sensors, etc. To better identify the network features and the heterogeneity of 
different sensing elements, this block is divided into three levels: 
 
1. Sensor physical features: this level describes the physical characteristics of individual 
sensors and the type of parameters they measure as: on-board sensors, identifier, 
measured parameters and communication channels (wired or wireless).  
2. Measurement typology: this level models the different types of measurements made by 
the sensors and the associated proprieties. 
3. Topology: this level models network topology characteristics as sensor localisation, 
deployment features, sensors communication topologies and distances. 
 
Monitoring system model  
 
This block is responsible for the reasoning on measurements taken by the sensors, for 
event classification and for triggering reliable alarms. It is composed by three levels that 
correspond to three different operating phases; the first two levels operate in real-time, 
they are designed for the early detection of dangerous situations launching alarms, the 
post reasoner level aims at providing information on the state of the system, and it usually 
works at a later time in order to refine/re-parameterise the on-line configuration. 
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In particular, the operating phases can be described as follows: 
 
Real-time acquired knowledge 
 
This  is the phase where the system collects all the measurements from the individual 
heterogeneous sensors. It provides a level of integration for the measurements made by 
the sensor networks. It models the typology, the structure and the values of raw and 
structured data acquired and transmitted by sensors, enriched with semantic information 
about them [77]. At this level, the data is modelled and processed by both the fast classifier 
and the post reasoner. The encoding language, used to process and transmit information is 
the RDF standard. 
 
Real-time classified knowledge 
 
This  is the phase where the classification of events is performed on-time. The in-line 
classified knowledge layer models the knowledge derived by the application, on the 
sensed data. This level already works on semantically enriched data. The overhead for 
linking data with information about them is necessary at this level because there is a 
multitude of events that can be detected only by combining information from collections 
of sensors, which are heterogeneous both for typology of measurement carried out and for 
the data format in which they are sent to centraliser nodes. Furthermore, at this level, not 
all the details on the current situation are taken in consideration, in order to allow the 
classifier to perform efficient decision tasks, even if it is not able to derive the full 
knowledge about the monitored environment. The cut information is then re-considered 
into the abstract model of the post reasoner knowledge, which works without real-time 
constraints. 
 
Post reasoner knowledge 
 
This level traces all system events and applies rules of inference on collected data, in order 
to analyse retrospectively the relationship between the sensor measurements, the 
classification of events and associated alarms notified. The level is designed to simplify the 
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evaluation of the causes of critical events, allowing operators to refine the classification 
criteria based on the information provided by the tracking of events that led to false 
alarms (false positive or false negative). This layer is focused to derive useful knowledge 
to have a detailed view of the situation, finalised to: 
• help in situation awareness 
• support in the decision process. 
The system implementing the semantic reasoner is much more computational expensive 
than the classifiers used for the real-time decision. At this level, in fact, the outputted 
inferred data is designed to give support to users with offline reasoning and data mining 
features, which can be exploited to get a complete knowledge of the situations, even at a 
later time. 
 
Figure 5 System Model 
 
 
4.3 The system architecture 
 
The core of the monitoring system is made of: 
• a smart event classifier (implementing the real-time acquired and classified 
knowledge layers) 
• a post reasoner (implementing the post reasoner knowledge layer). 
 
We implemented a fast classifier in order to detect potential dangerous condition and 
then, if necessary, raise an alarm. The event detection is carried out by correlating data 
coming from different sensors. In fact, in real situations the potential hazard cannot be 
        Sensor Information 
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detected by using data coming from a single device. According to the above considerations, 
we designed and developed different modules to:  
 
• semantically enrich the data 
• implement the smart real-time classifier 
• implement the post-reasoner. 
 
The proposed architecture is illustrated in Figure 6. We suppose that the sensor data 
source consists of heterogeneous sensors or groups of sensor (WSN, camera, intrusion 
device, etc.) measuring different parameters. Data are gathered from sensor nodes and can 
be accessed through a specific sensor gateway. Gateway sensors code the data in XML. 
The system is made of three modules: 
• Transformation and integration module: It gathers and integrates data coming 
from heterogeneous sensors, in order to make them suitable for the population of 
the ontological model implemented into the ‘semantic classifier’ module. Data are 
semantically labelled, to add information and description about measures and 
sensors ([78],[79]). This information is then automatically encoded in RDF triples 
by using a XSLT transformation engine implemented by the transformation 
module. The RDF files, produced by any network, contain unique references to 
descriptions of the measured variables and parameters. They are then integrated 
(integrator module) into a single RDF file, containing instances of the measured 
values that will then populate the ontology. 
 
• Semantic classifier module: this component implements the fast classifier. The 
events detection is carried out by correlating data coming from different sensors. 
The implemented classifier is rule-based: the combination of measurements allows 
classifying events, if there is a particular event, classified as critical; the system 
raises the corresponding alarm. The smart classifier operates on semantically 
enriched data, so, a rule can be expressed by combining atomic events from 
heterogeneous sources. Information about events are managed in the RDF DB 
(triple store) that contains all the event instances codified in RDF; events 
combination is codified trough SWRL rules [80]. The chosen classifier has a 
standard structure to build a predictive model, based on a learner and a predictor 
component. We adopted a decision tree classifier [81]. In decision tree 
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mechanisms, the set of decision rules is modelled as a tree in which leaves 
represent class associated to atomic events to be detected and branches represent 
conjunctions of features, i.e., condition on the sensed data that lead to those 
dangerous composed event classes. In order to define the branch rules of the 
decision tree, a domain expert manually defines a training set made of already 
classified data; the learner module uses these data in order to set the predictor 
parameters, which tune the automatic detection of an alert condition. The predictor 
is responsible to classify the data to decide if alarm conditions occur. To increment 
the system performance, the rules are pruned recurring to a manual refinement 
made by domain experts. In Listing 1, a small example of rule is reported; it has 
been codified as a tree branch (Figure 7). The rule states that if two different 
sensors (S1 and S2) in a given position detect a pressure value above a given 
threshold, then an alarm must be arisen. Note that the pressure is expressed with 
different measure units but this problem is completely overcome thanks to the 
semantic enrichment that is not reported in this example. 
 
 
Listing 1 Example of rule 
 
The predictor is a parametric system, and parameters are used to tune the reliability of the 
classifier output. Periodically, or even when misclassified events occur, the learner can 
recalculate the parameters of the predictor on the basis of a new training set, properly 
built to refine the behaviour of the classifier. Furthermore, the classifier may be 
synthesised with a reconfigurable hardware as an FPGA to boost up the performance and 
meet real-time constraints [82]: 
• Post reasoner module: This module provides functionality to query the data 
correlated to events using the query language [83] and enables the ability to 
perform further analysis with other methods of classification. This allows to 
analyse the causes of the critical events that have taken place (basic function for an 
operator) and to refine the procedures and rules of classification if a false alarm 
( S1.location=41°53’24” N, 12° 29’ 32” E,  
  S1.Pressure >101.325 kPa, 
  S2.Pressure >30inHg, 
  S2.location=41° 53’ 37” N, 12° 29’ 11” E) 
  ? Alarm 
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rate is not acceptable. Reasoning operations are performed on the data in order to 
extract inferred knowledge from them, recurring at Pellet [84] reasoner. 
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Figure 6 System architecture 
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Figure 7 Example of rule:tree branch 
 
 
The classification actions performed in real-time feed the knowledge base for the post 
reasoner component. The just built ontology is stored in a triple store repository [85] and 
can be used offline through the adoption of semantic query languages as SPARQL  [86]. 
Through queries, the post reasoner is able to understand and explain to end users the 
meaning of the alarms and their causes. 
The knowledge base can be seen as an information repository about a particular domain of 
interest. Typical knowledge bases consist of concepts, properties and instances. We 
encoded the knowledge base by using an ontology, i.e., a set of classes, properties and 
instances defined as follows. The classes define the domain concepts; the properties define 
the relation between classes (domain to range) or attributes (a property of a class). The 
ontology depends in part on the environment and it will be illustrated in next sections 
with a case study. 
During reasoning, inferences are made, classifying instances of the ontology and 
associating new properties to instances while maintaining logical consistency. 
The reasoner, based on Pellet [87], is able to infer logical consequences from a set of 
asserted facts about the monitoring system defined by user experts. In particular, it is 
composed of two components, one implementing the general inference rules and one the 
specialist rules, defined by domain experts in order to capture the relevant knowledge 
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about the environment to be monitored. The system uses first-order predicate logic to perform 
reasoning. The inferences proceed both by forward chaining and by backward chaining. 
 
4.4 Data model and processing 
 
In this section, we explain the data processing workflow, detailing how the data is 
gathered, integrated and analysed. The relevant domain knowledge is encoded with the 
help of domain experts using a proper ontology, which models the elements of interest in 
terms of concepts and relationships relating to the phenomena to be monitored, the events 
and the associated actions to be performed. 
The proposed system manipulates sensed data for raising alarms, performing the 
following steps: 
1. Sensor networks gather data and format them in XML files [104], they encode both 
sensor properties and measured values. 
2. Using XLST engine, XML files are semantically enriched and transformed in RDF 
files. This file is compliant with the domain ontology and it is suitable to perform 
semantic reasoning. 
3. Composition rules are defined and applied to simple events in order to build 
composed events, they are coded in SWRL [80] and used to automatically populate 
the ontological model. 
4. By exploiting JENA primitives, the ontological model is automatically populated 
with the RDF triple instances. 
5. The classifier module is able to detect critical events. The classification is 
performed on the basis of a training set containing properly labelled composed 
events. 
 
Classified data populate the domain ontology. The data can be queried for the offline 
analyses and rules refinement for preventing critical events misclassification. To detail the 
information processing steps, we will adopt a running example on a real use case. As 
already said, a critical scenario consists of a sequence of simple and composed events. To 
model such scenario we have built an ontology. An example of ontology for physical 
security in railway domain system, reported in Figure 8 aims at representing the domain of 
interest (including measures, events and alarms), i.e., a subway station monitoring system. 
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The ontology is implemented through JENA (http://jena.apache.org/) library. According to 
the system model, the ontology has been structured in three parts: the class describing the 
Sensors features, the class describing the Measurement and the class describing the 
Detected_Events. The Sensor class includes the sensors description and has subclasses for 
each device sensor type (e.g., Infrared_Barrier, Intelligent_Camera…). The Sensor class is 
associated to different classes (Sensor_Type, Location, Measurement, Detect_event). The 
Sensor_Type class specifies for each sensor the measured parameters and their properties. 
Location class specifies the sensor location, while the Measurement class provides 
description of the measures performed by each sensor (e.g., Train_Passing, Line_cross, …). 
For modelling the events, we have defined the Detected_Event and Alarm classes 
describing the properties of several events that can be detected by the system from the 
measurements made by the sensors. The Detected_Event class is specialised into simple 
events (e.g., average temperature and high humidity) and composed events that defined 
by composing different events and measurements from multiple sensors. Simple events 
are detected by the measure of a single sensor and can be correlated in composed event. 
Composed_Event, classified as critical, are associated to proper alarms described by the 
Alarm_Class. As already said, event composition is performed by using rules written in 
SWRL, with the help of domain experts. 
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Figure 8 Example of Ontology for Physical Security 
 
 
4.5 A typical case study in Railways Security Domain 
 
This section illustrates the application of our system in a typical case study of a subway 
station [88]. The station is supervised through different sensor technologies (smart-cameras, 
infrared sensors, etc…). The correlation of the different measures, gathered by the sensors, 
allows to detect some events (e.g., physical intrusions, explosions, …) and, if necessary, raise a 
proper alarm to the operator. 
The station is equipped with a security system including intelligent cameras (S1), active 
infrared barriers (S2) and explosive sniffers chemical biological radiological and nuclear 
explosive (CBRNe) (S3) for tunnel portal protection. 
The critical scenarios are expressed through the composition of simple events detected by 
these sensors. For example, we show the detection of the Drop_Explosive_Tunnel event, 
regarding the release of explosives in an underground tunnel. 
Let us suppose that the dynamic of the scenario follows the steps reported below: 
 66 
1. the attacker stays on the platform for the time needed to prepare the attack, missing 
one or more trains 
2. the attacker goes down the tracks by crossing the limit of the platform and moves 
inside the tunnel portal 
3. the attacker drops the bag containing the explosive device inside the tunnel and leaves 
the station. 
These events are detected by sensors Si and can be specified as follows: 
• E1. Loitering presence on the platform (E1 by S1) 
• E2. train passing (E2 by S1) 
• E3. platform line crossing (E3 by S1) 
• E4. tunnel intrusion (E4 by S2) 
• E5. explosive detection (E5 by S3) 
• C1. Dangerous_Presence C1 <-(E1, E2) 
• C2 Possible_Explosive C2 <-(E4, E5). 
 
Where E1, E2, E3 and E4 are simple events, C1 and C2 are composed events. The combined 
event Drop_Explosive_Tunnel occurs if one of the two composed events takes place: 
1. if (E1, E2) and then (E4, E5) 
2. if E3 and then (E4, E5). 
 
In the remainder of this section, we illustrate in details how the system detects the first case. 
Listing 2 reports the sensed data codified in XML. The listing contains basic information about 
the CBRNE sensor, detecting the presence of an explosive (value = true). In particular for a 
sensor is reported the node ID, the measured values and temporal information. 
 
 
Listing 2 CBRNE Sensor Output in XML format 
 
 
 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> 
   <result> 
    <nodeid value='1'/> 
    <location value='Station1'> 
    <name value='Chemical_Presence'/> 
    <data value='true'/> 
<timestampvalue='2012-05-13T09:00:03+01:00'/> 
 </result> 
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The output information is then semantically enriched by exploiting the proper domain 
ontologies. Using XLST engine, the XML file is transformed in RDF, as reported in Listing 3. The 
RDF file, containing the sensed data and their semantic descriptions, is automatically created. 
 
 
Listing 3 Semantic enriched information of Simple Event in RDF 
 
Listing 4 reports the composition, performed by SWRL defined rules, of two events already 
integrated and coded in RDF. The listing describes the sensors CBRN1, instance of CBRNe 
class, able to observe chemical presence, and CHEM2, instance of Chemical_Presence Class, 
positioned in the station 1 (S1). 
The Boolean CHEM2 allows the smart classifier to infer the presence of explosive event, in 
fact, it firstly detects simple events, compose them and raise the alarm condition. The 
composition of these simple events produces the following composed events C1 
(Dangerous_Presence) and C2 (Possible_Explosive). 
 
C1 states that if both events E1 and E2 occur in the same time range, then 
‘Dangerous_presence’ event is triggered, the second one states if E4 and E5 events occur, the 
composite event ‘Possible_Explosive’ is detected. The combination, with temporal constraints, 
of  ‘Dangerous_Presence’ and ‘Possible_Explosive’ events triggers the ‘Drop_Explosive_Tunnel’ 
event, launching the corresponding alarm. 
Listing 5 represents the activation event E5 ‘Detect_Explosive’ is triggered by condition on 
‘is_Explosive_Detection’. In the second part of the listing, the event ‘Drop_Explosive_Tunnel’ is 
composed as composition of ‘Dangerous_Presence’ and ‘Possible_Explosive’ that occur in 
temporal succession. 
 
<!-- http://www.owl ontologies.com/Ontology1.owl#Chem2 --> 
 <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1.owl#Chem2"> 
   <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1.owl#Chemical_presence"/> 
   <atTimeDate rdf:datatype="&xsd;dateTimeStamp">2012-05-
13T09:00:03+01:00</atTimeDate> 
   <hasChem rdf:datatype="&xsd;boolean">true</hasChem> 
 </owl:NamedIndividual> 
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Listing 4 Semantic Enriched Information about Sensor Measurement in RDF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1335263048.owl#CBRN1 --> 
 
  
<owl:Thing rdf:about="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#CBRN1"> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl #CBRNe"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl #Sensor"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#NamedIndividual"/> 
<&Ontology1:Measure rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Chem1"/> 
<&Ontology1:Measure rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Chem2"/> 
<&Ontology1:hasType rdf:resource="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl# 
Chemical"/> 
<&Ontology1:Detect rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Explosive"/> 
<&Ontology1:hasLocation rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Station1"/> 
</owl:Thing> 
 
 
<!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Chem2 --> 
 
<owl:Thing rdf:about="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Chem2"> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Chemical_presence"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Event"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Measurement"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Sensor"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#NamedIndividual"/> 
<&Ontology1:atTimeDate 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTimeStamp">  
2012-05-13T09:00:03+01:00 </&Ontology1:atTimeDate> 
<&Ontology1:hasChem rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"> 
true </&Ontology1:hasChem> 
<&Ontology1:MeasureFrom rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl 
#CBRN1"/> 
<&Ontology1:Measure 
rdf:resource="http://www.owlontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Explosive"/> 
</owl:Thing> 
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Listing 5 Semantic Enriched Information about Composed Event in RDF format 
 
 
Listing 6 shows the activation of the alarm raised by the ‘Detect_Drop_Explosive’ event. The 
conditions used to manage and understand the cause of the alarms may be queried offline, 
through a user friendly interface that exploits SPARQL language for querying the semantic 
 
<!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1.owl#Detect_Dangerous_Presence --> 
 
<owl:Thing rdf:about="#Detect_Dangerous_Presence"> 
  <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Composed_Event"/> 
  <rdf:type rdf:resource=" #Dangerous_Presence"/> 
  <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Detect_Event"/> 
  <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Simple_Event"/> 
  <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1#NamedIndividual"/> 
  <Ontology1:Detect_Time rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime"> 
    2012-05-13T09:00:05+01:00  
  </Ontology1:Detect_Time> 
  <Ontology1:is_Dangerous_Presence 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">       
   true  
  </Ontology1:is_Dangerous_Presence> 
 <Ontology1:Composed_From rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Detect_Long_Presence" /> 
<Ontology1:Composed_From rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Detect_Train"/> 
</owl:Thing> 
 
<!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Possible_Explosive --> 
 
<owl:Thing rdf:about="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Possible_Explosive"> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Composed_Event"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Event"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Possible_Explosive"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.owl-ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Simple_Event"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#NamedIndividual"/> 
<&Ontology1:Detect_Time rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">  
2012-05-13T09:00:07+01:00 </&Ontology1:Detect_Time> 
<&Ontology1:is_Possible_Explosive 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"> true 
</&Ontology1:is_Possible_Explosive> 
<&Ontology1:Composed_From rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Explosive" /> 
<&Ontology1:Composed_From rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/&Ontology1.owl#Detect_Intrusion"/> 
</owl:Thing> 
 
<!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1.owl#Detect_Drop_Explosive --> 
 
<owl:Thing rdf:about="&Ontology1#Detect_Drop_Explosive"> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Composed_Event"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Detect_Event"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Drop_Explosive_Tunnel"/> 
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#NamedIndividual"/> 
<Ontology1:is_Drop_Explosive_Tunnel 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">true</Ontology1:is_Drop_Explosiv
e_Tunnel><Ontology1:CanGenerate rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Allarme"/> 
<Ontology1:Composed_From rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Detect_Dangerous_Presence"/> 
<Ontology1:Composed_From rdf:resource="&Ontology1#Detect_Possible_Explosive"/> 
</owl:Thing> 
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enriched data about the situation, like the alarms that have been triggered and the events 
detected. 
In the Post Reasoner level it is possible, for an operator, to analyse the alarm activation. In our 
example, the operator can query the system in order to obtain all instances involved in the 
relation ‘Alarmfrom’ that associated every alarms to the Composed_Events generating it. In this 
way, he can know all composed events which have generated the alarm (Figure 9, Listing 7). 
 
 
Listing 6 Semantic Enriched Information about Raising Alarm Event 
 
 
 
 
Listing 7 SPARQL query of Events raising alarms 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 SPARQL  Result of Events raising Alarm 
 
In our example the system output the result showed in Figure 10.  The operator can know the 
simple events composing a given Composed_Events. Performing the query reported in the 
Listing 8, the system shows all instances of Simple_Events involved in the relation 
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> 
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> 
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> 
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> 
PREFIX ontology: <http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1.owl#> 
 
 
SELECT ?x ?y 
WHERE { ?x ontology:Alarmfrom ?y} 
 
 
<!-- http://www.owl-ontologies.com/Ontology1.owl#Alarm --> 
 <owl:Thing rdf:about="&Ontology1;Alarm"> 
   <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Ontology1;Alarm"/> 
   <rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;NamedIndividual"/> 
   <Ontology1:message rdf:datatype="&xsd;string"></Ontology1:message> 
   <Ontology1:message rdf:datatype="&xsd;string">Attention 
Explosive Presence </Ontology1:message> 
        <Ontology1335263048:Alarmfrom 
rdf:resource="&Ontology1;Detect_Drop_Explosive"/> 
    </owl:Thing> 
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‘Composed_From’ with Composed_Events. In this way, the operator will be aware of all events 
composing each composed events, Figure 10. 
 
 
Listing 8 SPARQL query of Simple Events associated to a Composed Event. 
 
 
Figure 10 SPARQL results Composed Events 
 
 
 
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> 
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> 
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> 
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> 
PREFIX Ontology: <http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1335263048.owl#> 
 
 
SELECT ?x ?y 
WHERE { ?x Ontology:Composed_From ?y} 
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Chapter 5 
Measurement of logical security by nSHIELD metrics 
methodology 
 
 
As introduced in the first chapter, the logical security, nowadays has widespread as a vital 
need in order to protect a critical infrastructure by not only physical attack but also by attacks 
to the information system. In this section we provide a methodology for measurement  logical 
security, developed in the European project named nSHIELD (new embedded Systems 
arcHItecturE for multi-Layer Dependable solutions). 
 
5.1 The New SHIELD Architectural framework 
 
New SHIELD (nSHIELD) is a European research project co-funded by the Artemis Joint 
Undertaking (Subprogramme SP6) focused on the research of innovative solutions for 
security, privacy, dependability (SPD) in the context of embedded systems (ES) [89].  
The nSHIELD project aims at addressing SPD issues as “built in” rather than as “add-on” 
functionalities, by adopting an innovative holistic approach. We perceive this strategy as 
being the first step towards SPD certification for future ES. The leading ideas at the basis of 
this research are: 
• To enrich the state-of-the-art with new SPD solutions 
• To enable the composability of these (new or already existing) solutions 
 
This will be achieved in two steps. First, starting from current SPD solutions, the project will 
develop new technologies and consolidate those already explored in pSHIELD (a SHIELD pilot 
project)  in a solid basement that will become the reference milestone for a new generation of 
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“SPD-ready” ES [90]. Second, these technologies will be then enhanced with the 
“composability” functionality that is being studied and formalized. 
 
In a nutshell, composability is the possibility of dynamically activating one or more SPD 
functionalities in order to achieve a desired SPD level. This is possible with the 
implementation of the following enabling mechanisms and technologies: 
• Semantic description of security domain and system components, in order to have a 
machine-understandable language to drive the automatic composition. 
• SPD Metrics, in order to quantify the security needs and the achieved security level 
over heterogeneous environments 
• Security Agent, the engine is in charge of continuously monitoring the environment to 
look for new components or new security needs 
• Policies and control algorithms to provide a solution for the “composition problem”, ie 
how to put together the available SPD technologies in order to achieve the security 
target. 
 
nSHIELD will approach SPD at 4 different levels: node, network, middleware and overlay (see 
Figure 11). For each level, the state of the art in SPD of individual technologies and solutions 
(ranging from hardware and communication technologies to cryptography, middleware, 
smart SPD applications, etc.) is expected to be significantly improved and integrated into the 
so-called SHIELD architectural framework, which will represent the breakthrough result of 
the project. 
The main objective of the project is to conceive and design an innovative, modular, 
composable, expandable and high dependable architectural framework. nSHIELD will achieve 
the desired SPD level in the context of integrated and interoperating heterogeneous services, 
applications, systems and devices, and will develop concrete solutions capable of achieving 
this objective in specific application scenarios with minimum engineering effort. Four 
scenarios have been carefully selected in order to cover a wide and significant range of 
expected industrial needs. 
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Figure 11 nSHIELD Framework 
 
One of these scenarios addresses dependable surveillance systems for rail-based transit 
security, but the aim is to extend applicability also to safety-critical (the so-called “vital”) 
subsystems in railway signalling, control and supervision. 
In these contexts, the composability of the SHIELD architectural framework will have great 
impact on the system design costs and time to market of new products and solutions. 
At the same time, the integrated use of SPD metrics in the framework will impact on the 
development cycles of SPD in ES because the qualification, (re-)certification and (re-) 
validation process of a SHIELD framework instance will be faster, easier and widely accepted. 
 
5.2 nSHIELD Attack Surface Metric  
 
This section introduces the detail of “nSHIELD's attack surface” and present the methodology . 
The approach is an integration of three different theory of scientific field: 
• An attack surface metric [91]. 
• The Open Source Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) 3 [92]. 
• Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology (CEM) [93].  
 
The integration is the merging of 3 theory that assures the expression of SPD metric by a 
cardinal number.  
An attack surface is a set of modes in which an attacker can entry in contact with a system and 
cause a disaster or a failure.  
The work is on two different issues: the dependability and security. The former concerns   
non-malicious faults, the latter concerns  malicious attacks or faults.  
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The nSHIELD proposals integrate the dependability and security concept. It consider the 
threat as the origin of the fault chain (fault -> errors -> failures) for the dependability and as 
the potential for abuse of protected assets by the system for security.  
The malicious human activity or non-malicious event  of an attacker are addresses to the 
entry and exit point of a system. The entry and exit point are characterized by 3 factors:  
Porosity, Controls, and Limitations [92]. The characteristics of entry and exit point defines the 
likelihood of being used by an attacker. The measurement is the total contribution of Porosity, 
Controls and Limitations. 
 
5.3 SPD level  
 
A threat has the capacity to subvert the security or the dependability of a system and in order 
to be effective, it shall interact directly or indirectly with the asset. So the aim is to separate 
the threat from the asset in order to avoid the interaction the total separation means SPD 
level=100.  Otherwise the protection and increase of SPD level can be assured by Control can 
be applied on asset in order to lessen the impact and the interaction of a threat. The Controls 
are different, but they can increase the interaction so often more controls introduce more 
threats. So it is important to separate controls by what they do in operations. 
 
5.3.1 Porosity 
 
The separation between an asset and a threat exists or it does not. There are 3 logical and 
proactive modes to create this separation:  
 
1. Create a physical or logical barrier between the asset and the threats  
2. Change the threat to a harmless state  
3. Remove the threat.  
 
During the analysis of a system, the important is to identify the possible interaction. This 
parameter id called “Porosity” [92]. The porosity reduces the separation between a threat and 
an access. It is characterized by three elements: Complexity, Access and Trust. 
Each point of interaction (Access) reduces the security and then the SPD Level. The increase of 
porosity is the decrease in SPD and each pore is a Complexity, Access, or Trust. In detail: 
 76 
 
• Complexity: number of critical components for the dependability and security of the 
system, which failure might not be tolerated. 
• Access: since the SPD level is the separation of a threat and an asset then the ability to 
interact with the asset directly is to access it. Access is  the number of possible 
interaction with the system. Removing direct interaction with an asset will halve the 
number of ways it can be taken away.  
• Trust: is a trust Access which don’t menace the security of the system, it is an access 
but trust.  
 
For each access pore identified, it's calculate the  damage potential-effort ratio to have a 
consistent measure of the lack of separation that introduces. Not all access pores contribute 
equally to system’s porosity measurement because not all access pores are equally likely to be 
used by an attacker [91]. From an attacker’s point of view, however, damage potential and 
effort are related; if the attacker has higher privilege by using a method in an attack, then the 
attacker also gains the access rights of a larger set of methods. The attacker spends more 
effort to gain a higher privilege level that then enables the attacker to cause damage as well as 
gain more access rights. The ratio is similar to a cost-benefit ratio; the damage potential is the 
benefit to the attacker in using a resource in an attack and the effort is the cost to the attacker 
in using the resource. 
 
5.3.2 Controls 
 
Controls reduce the interaction between threat and assets.  There are 2 main categories of 
controls in which are declared 12 kind of controls. 
 
Interactive Controls 
 
The Interactive Controls are directly related complexity, access, or trust interactions and they 
influence them. The categories are the following:   
• Authentication is a control through the challenge of credentials based on 
identification and authorization.  
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• Indemnification is a control through a contract between the asset owner and the 
interacting party. This contract may be in the form of a visible warning as a precursor 
to legal action if posted rules are not followed, specific, public legislative protection, or 
with a third-party assurance provider in case of damages like an insurance company.  
• Resilience is a control over all interactions to maintain the protection of assets in the 
event of corruption or failure.  
• Subjugation is a control assuring that interactions occur only according to defined 
processes. The asset owner defines how the interaction occurs which removes the 
freedom of choice but also the liability of loss from the interacting party.  
• Continuity is a control over all interactions to maintain interactivity with assets in the 
event of corruption or failure.  
 
Process Controls  
 
The Process Controls define defensive processes.  These controls do not directly influence 
interactions rather they protect the assets once the threat is present.  
The categories are the following:   
• Non-repudiation is a control which prevents the interacting party from denying its 
role in any interactivity.  
• Confidentiality is a control for assuring an asset displayed or exchanged between 
interacting parties cannot be known outside of those parties.  
• Privacy is a control for assuring the means of how an asset is accessed, displayed, or 
exchanged between parties cannot be known outside of those parties.  
• Integrity is a control to assure that interacting parties know when assets and 
processes have changed.  
• Alarm is a control to notify that an interaction is occurring or has occurred.  
 
The Idemnification and  Authorization are related and they have not sense as single presence. 
So the Operational Security (OpSec), the porosity, has ten controls that a system  Analyst will 
need to identify and define.  
This two controls cannot be expressed by an operation, they are a process of  identification 
and verification respectively. The process can be corrupted or circumvented.  For example, a 
person  authorized to enter a room can be authorized with an identification of an other 
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person, but this doesn’t mean that the person is authorized, because this concepts cannot be 
transferred, this is a limitation. So Authentication control combines identification and 
authorization to map Access.  
While controls are a positive influence in OpSec, minimizing the attack surface, they can 
introduces a new access point to surface so it’s called they have limitations. The use of 
controls shall assure that they do not add new attack vectors into the target.  
 
5.3.3 Limitations 
 
The corruption  of  controls is their limitations. Therefore the state of security in regard to 
known flaws and restrictions within the operations scope is called Limitation.  Limitations has 
five categories that define the type of vulnerability, mistake, misconfiguration or deficiency by 
operation.  
The controls can be attacked by different threats, an Analyst shall know and understand the 
mechanism of a control failure in order to be aware of necessary level of protection of the 
system under test. So this is useful in order to plan  a precise planning in case of disaster and 
contingencies. 
 
The Limitation classifications are the following:  
• Vulnerability is the  error that can deny access to assets for authorized people or 
processes, allow for privileged access for unauthorized people or processes, or allow 
unauthorized people or processes to hide assets or themselves within the scope.  
• Weakness is the  error that abuses, or nullifies specifically the effects of the  
interactivity controls. 
• Concern is the error that disrupts or reduces the effects of the process controls. 
• Exposure is an unjustifiable action or error that provides direct or indirect complexity 
of targets or assets within the chosen scope channel.  
• Anomaly is unexpected error or flaw. 
 
To better understand how the connection with Controls, is possible to see Table 1. 
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Table 1 Controls and Limitations 
Category OpSec Limitations 
Complexity Exposure 
Access 
Operations 
Trust 
 
Vulnerability 
Authentication 
Idemnification 
Resilience 
Subjugation 
 
 
Interactive 
Continuity 
 
 
Weakness 
Non- Repudiation 
Confidentiality 
Privacy 
Integrity 
 
 
 
 
Controls 
 
 
Process 
Alarm 
Concern 
Anomaly 
 
5.4 Mathematical model of SPD Level 
 
The SPD level derives from three metrics defined in the previous sections: Operational 
Security, Controls and Limitations.  The input information will be aggregated and associated 
in the input categories. The SPD level formula assigns to each categories a logarithmic base 
value in order to scale the three factors: Porosity, Control and limitations. In breaf: 
 
Porosity (OpSec) 
 
Porosity, called also Operational security defined as:   
PtPaPcTrustAccessComplexityOpSec ++=++=  
The logarithmic base is defined as: 
 
)1001(log2 OpSecOpSecbase ∗+=  
 
Controls (OpSec) 
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The Control formula is defines as a Loss of control and it is : 
 
PtPaPcTrustAccessComplexityOpSec ++=++=  
 
Thus the Loss Control sum LCsum is given as: 
 
 
LCALLCItLCLCCfLCNrLCCtLCSuLCLCIdLCAuLCsum +++++++++= PrRe  
 
Now, it is necessary to determine the amount of Missing Controls, MCsum, in order to assess 
the level of the Security Limitations. This shall be done for each Loss Control categories. For 
example, to determine the Missing Controls for Authentication (MCAu) we must subtract the 
sum of Authentication Controls (LCAu) of the scope from the OpSecsum. The Missing Controls 
can never be less than zero however. 
 
The resulting Missing Control totals for each of the 10 Loss Controls must then be added to 
arrive at the total Missing Control value (MCsum). 
 
True Controls (TCsum) is the inverse of Missing Controls which means the True Controls for 
each individual control also need to be calculated before the results can be tallied into TCsum. 
The resulting True Control totals for each of the 10 Loss Controls must then be added to 
arrive at the total True Control value (TCsum). 
 
True Controls are used to measure the ideal placement of controls. The base value also helps 
to eliminate the influence of a disproportionate placement of controls on security. The True 
Controls base (TCbase) value is given as:  
TCbase = log2(1 + 100 × (OpSecsum - MCsum x 0.1)) 
 
True Coverage (TCvg) can be used to measure the percentage of controls in place regarding 
the optimal amount and placement of controls. True Coverage is then derived using the 
Missing Control totals. 
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Full Controls, on the other hand, take into account all controls in place regardless of a 
balanced distribution. This value is important for measuring the worth of two-factor 
authentication, for example, and other instances of defense in depth for the same complexity, 
access or trust. The Full Controls base (FCbase) value is given as: 
 
FCbase = log2(1 + 10 × LCsum) 
 
The Limitations Formula  
 
The Limitations are individually weighted. The weighting of the Vulnerabilities, Weaknesses 
and Concerns are based on a relationship between the Porosity or OpSecsum, the Loss 
Controls and in the case of Exposures and Anomaly the existence of other Limitations also 
plays a role. An Exposure or Anomaly poses no problems alone unless a Vulnerability, 
Weakness or Concern is also present. Think of an Exposure like a pointer. If there is a pointer 
that goes nowhere, or in this case doesn’t lead to anything exploitable (Vulnerability, 
Weakness, Concern) and all Controls are accounted for, then at the time of the test the 
Exposure has no effect on security and thus has no value in the SPD level.  
Table 2 is used to calculate the SecLimsum variable, as an intermediate step between the 
Security Limitation inputs and the SecLimbase variable. 
 
Table 2 SecLimsum variable calculating 
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SecLimsum is then calculated as the aggregated total of each input multiplied by its 
corresponding weighted value as defined in the table 2. 
 
SPD Level Formula 
 
The Actual SPD level Delta is useful for comparing products and solutions: 
 
ActSPDL∆ = FCbase – OpSecbase - SecLimbase 
 
To measure the current state of operations with applied controls and discovered limitations, a final 
calculation is required to define Actual SPD level. 
 
ActSPDL = 100 +ActSPDL∆ – (1\100)× (OpSecbase × FCbase – OpSecbase × SecLimbase + 
FCbase × SecLimbase) 
 
5.5 The nShield attack surface metrics ontology  
 
As previous described, the nSHIELD framework trough a specific middleware is able to 
elaborate and define in machine understandable manner the calculate metrics. This is trough 
and ontology description of metrics information coming by appropriate device installed in the 
monitoring application who have the responsibility to study and control the SPD level of the 
system. 
The system is modelled as a surface (definition by metrics methodology). Surface has  amount 
of interfaces to the external world (access), interactions between components (complexity) 
and internal/external interactions with no direct impact on security (trust).  These three 
concepts are  represented by a number. In an ontology model these attributes can be 
represented in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 Porosity Ontology 
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Controls counteracts vulnerability (identified by the number of “accesses”) The controls can 
be classified in interactive (Class A) and process (Class B) controls (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13 Control Ontology 
 
Each control can be affected by a set of limitations, Figure 14 
 
 
Figure 14 Limitation Ontology 
 
These attribute, as described in the previous section, are composed by a proper algebra, to 
obtain the metric value for the whole system.  Then a proper domain data base is needed to 
tailor the result to the specific application scenario. 
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The Figure 15 represents better the relation between different values and attributes, by an E-R 
diagrams. 
 
 
Figure 15 SPD attribute integration 
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Chapter 6 
Case study  
 
In this section will be presented some application of the methodology shown in the previous 
section both physical security and logical. Furthermore, the section will present a particular 
case study in which the Post Reasoner analysis it will be essential for the configuration 
assessment. 
 
6.1 Physical Security a  WSN Application: Post Reasoner application 
 
In this section we will present a experimentation results conducted with real data gathered 
from a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). The real date was taken from the Intel Lab Set of 
Berkeley [105]. The dataset contains data collected from 54 sensors deployed in the Intel 
Berkeley Research Lab between February 28th and April 5th, 2004. The nodes are Mica2Dot 
sensors with weather boards collected topology information, along with humidity, 
temperature, light and voltage values with timestamp information for each measurement, 
once every 31 seconds . The format of the dataset is: date, time, epoch, mote ID, temperature, 
humidity, light, and voltage. 
The sensor ids range from 1-54. Data from some sensor motes may be missing or truncated. 
Temperature is measured in degrees Celsius. Humidity is temperature corrected relative 
humidity, ranging from 0-100%. Light is in Lux (a value of 1 Lux corresponds to moonlight, 
400 Lux to a bright office, and 100,000 Lux to full sunlight.) Voltage is expressed in volts, 
ranging from 2-3.  
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The data was in CVS format, in order to be compliant with our classifier system, we have 
translate the data in XML format, according to a specific data model represented in Listing 9. 
 
 
Listing 9 XML example of data model 
 
In order to create a rule for a real case study, it is chosen a range of temperature and 
humidity, which, when they was exceeded an alarm was raised. The case study is a monitoring 
of technical room, such as a server room. The critical value in a server room are: temperature 
over 24° and Humidity over 55%. When this values exceed the environment condition are not 
compliant for the server installed in a room. And when the temperature reach the values of 
40° and Humidity about 30%, this values reveal a critical situation. 
The experimentation have noticed that in normal operation the sensor reveal a value of 
temperature between (19° - 23,9°) and Humidity between (50%-55%). But after a more days 
of observation the temperature increase in uncontrolled manner and an critical alarm was 
raising (according to the configured rules). After the increment temperature sensors get stuck 
at value (122◦C). In a Post Reasoner Analysis with query SPARQL and other methodology of 
data analysis form the database, it is notice that the stuck at was correlated to the low battery. 
The batteries in this case were lithium ion cells, which keep almost a constant voltage over 
their duration; note that variations in voltage are highly correlated with temperature (Figure 
16 and Figure 17). Analysing the medium value of the voltage it is notice that the battery can 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--Sample XML file generated by XMLSpy v2008 (http://www.altova.com)--> 
 
<Sensor1 xmlns:xsi=http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance 
 
 name="XXX" 
 NET="XXX" 
 ID="XXX" 
 Measure_type="XXX" 
      Measure_type="XXX" 
      position="XXX"> 
 
   <Humidity 
      name="XXX" 
      values="XXX" 
      Time="timestamp" 
   /> 
 
 
   <Temperature 
      name="XXX" 
      values="XXX" 
      Time="timestamp" 
   /> 
<Voltage…./> 
......... 
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be considered low when it is under 2,25 volts. In this manner is possible to update and re-
configure the detection rules in order to deny next false alarms.  
 
 
Figure 16 Temperature, Voltage results 
 
 
 88 
 
Figure 17 Voltage, humidity results 
 
 
6.2 Joint estimation of physical and logical security 
 
Approaches analysed, for the joint estimation, are different and they can be go from event, 
correlation to the integration  of SPD metrics for logical security. In this section we will 
describe and explain with simple example the two approaches.  
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6.2.1 Integration as event correlation 
 
In this kind of approach to the convergence and evaluation of physical and logical security, 
the estimation and detection is made by event correlation.  
In this case we have needed the use of physical sensors and logical sensors with specific 
function for logical security detection. For this kind of scenario, it is possible refer to ontology 
presented in the section 4, naturally to be specialized for  the domain. 
 
The scenario consist in a detection of logical security attack. A typical scenario can be the 
following: 
1. A person enters in a room server. The servers manage the video surveillance system. 
2. During the presence of this people, it is detected an high number of failed access to the 
server 
3. After a successful log in, the Intrusion detection system for the network reveals some 
malicious action and alert the operator. 
4. In the same time there is a video loss signal from some cameras. 
5. The attacker has made an information attack to the video surveillance system. 
 
The sensors are: 
• S1. Card Reader (Physical Access) 
• S2. File Log Server (logic security sensor) 
• S3. Intrusion detection on network 
• S4. cameras 
 
The event detected by sensors are: 
 
• E1. Violated Physical Access of X by S1 
• E2. Anomaly number of failed Log in with a  UserName “pippo” by S2 
• E3. successful Log in of “pippo” by  S2 
• E4. activity of intrusion detection on network 
• E5. Video loss by S4 
• C1.  “Possible attack to server ” (E1,E2) 
• C2. “Possible Information Attack” (E3,E4) 
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The event “Attack to network” can be detected by two different modes.: 
 
1. If C1  and C2 
2. If C2 and E5  
 
 
This kind of approach gives a clear situation awareness, detection of attack in time. 
On the contrary, it requires elaboration of server, specific sensor and countermeasure for 
detection of security logic attack. 
 
 
6.2.2 Integration with  SPD  metrics elaboration 
 
This approach tries to detect  a possible situation of  a malicious attack to the information 
system starting from event of physical security and the elaboration of primitive data of 
sensor.  
The scenario consist in a monitoring of Access to a server room of a “Data Center”. In this 
scenario the objective is to detect an attack to logical security, in other words an attack to the 
server and its information system. A typical scenario can be the following: 
 
1. An user X enters in the server room with its card reader. It could be for the  
maintenance service or a simple employer, he has specific privileges to enter in the 
server room. 
1. after that it is registered a log in on server with credential  of user Y (which does not 
have done physical access in the room). 
2. X is different from Y, so it indicates a possible attack: log in not authorized by an user. 
 
In the room can be present other persons or people. 
 
We take in care as value the SPD metrics. As described in section 5, the SPD metrics derive 
from the Attack surface metrics and they take account of different kind of variables, it even an 
aggregated information.  
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Sensors are: 
 
• S1. Physical Log (Card Reader) this sensor gives information about: User, Entry, Exit, 
privileges 
• S2. Logic Log (File Log Server) 
 
• E1. Physical Access X, R\W, by S1 
• E2. Physical Access Y, R\W by S1 
• E3. Physical Access Z, -\-. By S1 
• E4. Logic Access X by S2 
• E5. Logic Access Y by S2 
• E6. Logic Access T   by S2 
• E7. Not Physical Access T by S1 (it is translated in the semantic classifier with a simple 
verification of the attribute of user T (Entry=false). 
 
The composed event are: 
 
• C1. “SPD Medium” it is verified E3 
• C2.  “Possible malicious logic Access” (E6, E7) 
 
The alarm “Malicious log in by an attacker” it is detected if: 
• if C1 and C2 -> “SPD Low” 
 
 
This kind of approach don’t request elaboration on server but only the analysis of log file, the 
log file of server is considered as a logic sensor. There is non need of addiction devices for the 
detection of security logic intrusion, the inference engine trough the rules elaborate the 
information and gives the alert. The effort is in configuration phase. In Figure 18 it is 
represented an ontology model for the scenario. 
The additional information of SPD metrics it is important and gives to the operator an 
awareness of the situation. The escalation of SPD level give an early warning, this is most 
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important in particular for the information protection. It elaborates a complex information in 
a simples syntactic information with an important semantic. 
The fusion and integration of this two different information, logical and physical security, 
given by different kind of sensors it was possible trough semantic application model. The SPD 
metrics has already  their semantic model in order to be machine-understandable. 
The dynamic nature of semantic model, gives the possibility of fusion of information that can 
be appear uncorrelated.  
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Figure 18 Physical and Logical Security Ontology 
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Conclusions 
 
The main objective of this thesis is the proposal of an approach for physical and logical 
security convergence. This is a problem that had a diffusion in the last ten years due to the  
development of new technologies. 
The work starting from the general problem of information integration for the critical 
infrastructure protection. It is been described the problem both from a physical security 
perspective and logical security point of view. Main issues on this topic are been introduced. 
The works has given a whole panoramic view on the state of art of: 
• Semantic model: solution used in this thesis for the modelling of information 
integration ad management for different source. This solution was adopted even for 
the possibility to apply reasoning and produces inferences on the information source 
and in order to  ensure a correct and shared information interpretation into events and 
situation assessment before raising an alarm. 
• Complex Event processing: the theory of CEP is used to model the detection model in 
the ontology, used to do inferences. 
• Decision support system: is the base of whole development systems. As matter of fact 
the system it is based on DSS with  semantic and ontological processing.  The semantic 
enrichment process is automatically performed to build a knowledge base, which will 
be inferred on-line by a light smart classifier that will raise an alarm in case of risk 
detection. The decision approach will be based on two steps: (1) a smart in-line 
classifier based on the semantic model to raise an alarm, in case of threat event 
detection, (2) a post reasoner offline inference engine, in order to further comprehend 
the event and its causes. 
 
The thesis has proposed and implemented  a methodology model simple data and atomic 
events coming from different sensors, it allows to model the complexity of the sensors and the 
 94 
correlation among different events to define composed events to improve the knowledge 
about the system and locate critical scenarios. The proposed monitoring system models the 
detection system as a two steps process 
• a in-line reaction by means of a fast classifier 
• an offline activity through a semantic post reasoner. 
 
The former aiming at providing proper alarms when dangerous events occur, the latter 
aiming at providing a complete and detailed picture of the situation, useful for operators both 
in understanding the situation and for decision supporting.  
It is been presented an experimentation of real data from WSN in which is  possible to observe 
the effectiveness of the inline smart classifier and the work of semantic post reasoner. 
 
After it is deled with the question of physical and security convergence. From the results 
obtained in the nSHIELD European project it is adopted the methodology of Attack surface 
metrics in order to estimate the logical security of a system under observation. This issued it 
is treated in two different modes:  
• for a pure event correlation 
• from SPD metrics solutions. 
 
The latter was a most suitable solution for our objective, because it declines the use of specific 
sensor for the logical security event detection and the adoption of metrics gives a detailed 
modelling on the situation and take in care different variable that influence the logical 
security of the system. 
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